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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan has managed to overcome a 
crumpling economy and ethnic tensions to become the wealthiest and most 
internationally respected republic in Central Asia: the only one to garner membership and 
leadership roles in the United Nations Security Council and the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe. How has Kazakhstan achieved this, given its history of 
oppression by foreign powers and its remote and vulnerable geography? Abandoning the 
logic of realism, President Nursultan Nazarbayev rejected the militaristic route to 
building state power, including giving up inherited Soviet nuclear weapons. Instead, he 
has implemented a “multi-vector” foreign policy that utilizes Kazakhstan’s mineral 
resource wealth and geopolitical position, taking advantage of major powers’ dependence 
on imported natural resources to build leverage. By examining his strategies through the 
lens of geoeconomics, this thesis sheds light on how a producer state can peacefully gain 
power vis-à-vis stronger neighbors in the modern international arena, what that means for 
U.S. foreign policy in dealing with illiberal regimes, and what challenges still lie ahead 
that may threaten to derail Kazakhstan’s unexpected and remarkable rise. 
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In 2010, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev scored a widely 
recognized diplomatic victory by securing the chairmanship of the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).1 Astana, the remote Kazakhstani capital 
located on the northern steppes, also played host to the OSCE’s first summit in 11 years, 
despite criticisms of Kazakhstan’s human rights and election records.2 In 2016, 
Kazakhstan became the first Central Asian state to secure a temporary seat on the United 
Nations Security Council, and since early 2017, Astana has been the improbable site of a 
series of multilateral peace negotiations over the ongoing Syrian civil war. Although 
Kazakhstan’s relationships with Russia and Syria may render its claim of neutrality 
suspect, Nazarbayev has garnered international respect for bringing both government and 
rebel belligerents to the negotiating table.3 To the majority of westerners who are 
unfamiliar with Central Asia, it came as a surprise that a relatively unknown republic 
from that region should be playing such a prominent international role. Indeed, the 
exploits of non-major powers such as Kazakhstan have often been overlooked by both 
policy makers and analysts, who consequently may be missing out on valuable lessons. 
Most international relations theories have focused on the interests and behaviors 
of the major powers while downplaying or outright disregarding the perspectives of 
comparatively weaker states.4 This worldview served scholars well in the age when 
major powers dominated international politics through a combination of military and 
                                                 
1 OSCE, “Kazakhstan Takes over OSCE Chair, Seeks to Strengthen Organization and Advance 
Dialogue on Future European Security Architecture,” OSCE Press Release, January 1, 2010, 
http://www.osce.org/cio/51810.  
2 Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan: Experts Give Astana Mixed Review on OSCE Chairmanship,” 
Eurasianet.org, January 13, 2011, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62707.  
3 Aigerim Toleukhanova, “Kazakhstan Secures Seat on UN Security Council,” Eurasianet.org, June 
29, 2016, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/79446; Samuel Ramani, “What Does Kazakhstan Have at Stake 
in Syria?,” The Diplomat, December 24, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/whatdoeskazakhstan 
haveatstakeinsyria; Rayhan Demytrie, “Kazakhstan Seeks Image Boost from OSCE Summit,” BBC News, 
December 1, 2010, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11880257. 
4 See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland 
Press, Inc., 1979); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton 
& Company, 2001).  
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economic might; however, in the era of globalization, the world is less a pie divided 
between a few empires than a complex neighborhood of diverse actors, each with its own 
toolbox for protecting vested interests. For example, modern major powers can no longer 
simply rely on military conquest or the threat of violence to secure the resources they 
need for continued growth, and this new dynamic has elevated the standings of “middle 
powers,” which can sometimes exert significant influence over the major powers. What, 
then, does “power” mean in the modern world? As part of the scholarship that 
continuously re-examines the changing phenomenon of state power, this thesis looks to 
the case of Kazakhstan. 
Still grappling with a myriad of domestic issues, Kazakhstan certainly belongs in 
the ranks of developing states in the eyes of most international observers, but during the 
two and a half decades of independence since the fall of the Soviet Union, this fossil fuel- 
and mineral-producing country has nevertheless risen to become the most economically 
powerful and internationally influential state in Central Asia. Situated geographically, 
economically, and politically at the intersection between several traditional major 
powers—Russia and China in particular, but also Europe and the United States to a lesser 
extent—Kazakhstan has skillfully carved out a niche for itself on the international scene. 
By most measures, Kazakhstan is punching above its weight in the global arena, and 
while quasi-authoritarian, resource-producing states that aspire to greatness are nothing 
new, Kazakhstan has succeeded in gaining international recognition and respect in a way 
few others have managed. How has Kazakhstan been able to achieve this feat while many 
other states have failed?  
This thesis argues that Nazarbayev’s regime secured independence and built 
international influence by taking advantage of the emerging multipolar structure of the 
post-Cold War era and adopting a geoeconomic—rather than militaristic—approach to 
foreign policy, which leverages Kazakhstan’s natural resources and geography to build a 
peaceful yet counter-balancing web of relationships with the major powers. 
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A. SIGNIFICANCE: KAZAKHSTAN, RESOURCES, AND THE 
OVERLOOKED MIDDLE POWERS 
An examination of Kazakhstan’s rise is relevant to two topics within the field of 
international relations: the roles and behaviors of “middle powers” and the question of 
how countries can leverage their natural resources to gain power.  
Toward the end of the Cold War, states that used to be considered peripheral in 
the context of the bipolar global order began to see their diplomatic horizons broaden 
with the thawing of East–West relations. The middle powers among them—those that are 
“weaker than the great powers … but significantly stronger than the … small states”—
started to take on more significant roles, albeit mostly regional or within specific issues, 
that were not available to them just a few decades earlier.5 This emerging dynamic 
piqued the interest of a small minority of international relations theorists, but the field in 
general remains heavily focused on the major powers for their might and the small states 
for their troubles.6 Nevertheless, the increasing prominence of middle powers in world 
affairs, such as Germany’s leadership within the European Union and Canada’s 
championing of human rights and economic issues, has called into question the 
traditionally accepted definition of power itself.7 Are realist notions of power obsolete in 
an interdependent, globalizing world? 
Studying the behaviors of middle powers is thus crucial for achieving a more 
holistic understanding of the international power structure that, in many ways, has been 
evolving since the end of the Cold War. The rigid bipolar structure has become more 
“uneven and multi-dimensional,” in which the once dominant military and security 
domain has yielded considerably to economic and social dimensions, and middle powers 
have become “alternative sources of agency” vis-à-vis the great powers.8  
                                                 
5 Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 4.  
6 Holbraad, Middle Powers, 4.  
7 Andrew F. Cooper, “Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview,” in Niche Diplomacy: Middle 
Powers After the Cold War, ed. Andrew F. Cooper (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 11.  
8 Ibid., 2, 1.  
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Kazakhstan serves as an illustrative example of a middle power; its ascendancy is 
an interesting case of a rising regional actor that is performing beyond expectations on 
the world stage. By studying the methods and policies that Nazarbayev’s regime has 
adopted, this thesis aims to further the understanding of how a newly independent state, 
saddled with historical baggage and facing strong contemporary headwinds, can 
nonetheless manage to not only survive, but soar above its peers, without overwhelming 
military or economic might. 
This thesis also touches on two topics in states’ use of their resources: gaining 
power and the politics of non-hydrocarbon energy resources. First, Kazakhstan serves as 
a ready example of how a state can leverage its resources into power. As the literature 
review will discuss, although scholars have devoted much work to the woes that often 
befall nations that are overly dependent on their resources, there is not a well-established 
playbook of how countries could use resources to peacefully and sustainably build power. 
Indeed, Kazakhstan’s path may only be one of many possibilities, but it could also 
become a model for other resource-rich developing states to emulate, thus leading to a 
convergence of positive behaviors. 
Second, as the preeminent energy source powering the modern global economy, 
fossil fuels—especially oil and gas—have dominated the literature on natural resources 
for nearly half a century. However, with prices in decline due to a combination of 
abundant supply and plateauing demand, the global resource trend may be in a 
transitional phase. Should the world turn to alternative sources of energy, understanding 
whether other energy resources come with the same promises and potential pitfalls as 
fossil fuels becomes ever more urgent. Comparing Kazakhstan’s policies toward its large 
supply of uranium, in addition to its oil and gas, provides a clue as to the roles that 
different natural resources will play in the future of international relations. 
Finally, this thesis analyzes Kazakhstan’s policies through the lens of 
geoeconomics, which is a relatively new and underdeveloped concept in international 
relations. Like other topics in the field, geoeconomics has primarily been examined from 
the perspective of major powers, and Kazakhstan serves well as a test case for applying 
this concept to modern middle powers. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Power: A Theoretical Grounding  
This thesis draws on literatures from four areas relating to power in international 
relations: sources of power, the connection between natural resources and power, middle 
powers, and the relatively new field of geoeconomics. Then the thesis applies this 
theoretical framework to the case of Kazakhstan: specifically, its quest for power and 
how it uses natural resources to that end. 
a. Sources of Power 
Morgenthau defines power as comprising “anything that establishes and maintains 
the control of man over man.”9 Traditional international relations theories emphasize the 
importance of military power and economic wealth, with military might being the 
ultimate form of power. However, scholars are increasingly challenging that primacy. 
In Waltz’s anarchic international order, without a supranational body that 
restrains states’ behavior, self-help is the norm, and “security is the highest end”; 
therefore, military power should take precedence over economic growth.10 Mearsheimer 
also sees military might as the ultimate form of power, while other forms, which he calls 
latent power, are merely stepping stones to military power. Before a state can possess a 
large military, he argues, it must first have the “money, technology, and personnel … 
socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power.”11  
In contrast, Keohane and Nye posit that in a new era of interdependence, “the 
power of nations … has become more elusive: ‘calculations of power are even more 
delicate and deceptive than in previous ages.’”12 Specifically, the role of military power 
has diminished as nations become mutually dependent on each other economically in “a 
                                                 
9 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New 
York: Alfred A Knopf, 1973), 9.  
10 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 126, 107. 
11 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 55.  
12 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1989), 3. 
 6 
tapestry of diverse relationships,” resulting in actions having reciprocal, rather than 
unidirectional, effects.13 
b. Natural Resources and Power 
Scholars have historically recognized natural resources as an importance source of 
military power and economic wealth. For example, Morgenthau develops an expanded 
list of elements that make up national power, which is primarily based on military and 
industrial might, but also on other categories such as geography, resources, national 
morale, diplomacy, and government.14  
Traditional theories examine the natural resource issue from the perspective of 
great power consumers. Being a realist, Morgenthau’s view of resources’ importance 
concerns entirely what a great power can procure either within its national borders or 
spheres of influences abroad. Nonetheless, he did anticipate that the all-important but 
hardly ubiquitous oil would bring about “a shift in the relative power of the politically 
leading nations.”15 This recognition is not new, as Muir wrote decades earlier that great 
empires depend on supplies “drawn from every part of the world.”16 While taking issue 
with the Keohane and Nye formulation of interdependence as a concept, Barry Jones 
notes that the global oil trade does indeed exhibit interdependency’s characteristics of 
mutual dependency and interconnectedness, with importing countries relying on the 
inflow of oil while the exporting countries rely on the revenue.17  
This debate is not sufficiently attentive to the perspective of resource producer 
states, which may possess a disproportionate power advantage over militarily and 
economically stronger countries. There are several ways that producer countries can use 
their natural resources to gain international influence, the most dramatic of which is the 
                                                 
13 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 4, 8. 
14 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 112–149.  
15 Ibid., 117–118.  
16 Ramsay Muir, The Interdependent World and Its Problems (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 
1971), 18.  
17 R. J. Barry Jones, “The Definition and Identification of Interdependence,” in Interdependence on 
Trial: Studies in the Theory and Reality of Contemporary Interdependence, ed. R. J. Barry Jones and Peter 
Willetts (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 21. 
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energy weapon: cutting off energy supplies to a target country to influence its decision 
making. Regarding oil and gas specifically, the current consensus is that the energy 
weapon is neither as potent as people fear nor as effective in gaining power for the 
exporter that wields it. After studying the oil weapon case of the Arab members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) placing an oil embargo and 
inducing an “oil price shock” in the 1970s, Mabro points out that this strategy is 
ineffective due to the large number of exporters in the global oil market.18 Similarly, 
Russia’s use of its gas weapon against Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 resulted in the exporter 
being the one who lost out through the lessening of both revenue and the reputation as a 
reliable supplier, prompting consumers to urgently seek out alternatives.19 
Another way that producers can use natural resources to build power is to finance 
their foreign policy with resource rents. Shaffer very briefly observes the connection 
between the windfall generated by oil and gas revenue and “more assertive foreign 
policy” on the part of suppliers, citing Venezuela and Iran as examples, both of which 
became more aggressive and confrontational in promoting their political agenda 
abroad.20 At the extreme end, Colgan identifies the “petro-aggression” phenomenon, in 
which revolutionary governments of petrostates, unhampered by domestic political risks 
due to the abundance of resource income, initiate international conflicts at a higher rate 
than comparable non-petrostates.21 Colgan cites Saddam Hussein’s ability to stay in 
power despite unfavorable outcomes in the wars with Iran and Kuwait.22 
The extensive literature on the troubles of overdependence on natural resource 
production, especially that of oil and gas, is replete with failing states suffering from 
                                                 
18 Robert Mabro, “The Oil Weapon,” Harvard International Review, December 31, 2007, 
http://hir.harvard.edu/economics-of-national-securitythe-oil-weapon. 
19 James Henderson, “Does Russia Have a Potent Gas Weapon?,” in The Palgrave Handbook of the 
International Political Economy of Energy, ed. Thijs Van de Graaf, Benjamin K. Sovacool, Arunabha 
Ghosh, Florian Kern, and Michael T. Klare (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2016), 465, 466, 
doi:10.1057/978-1-137-55631-8. 
20 Brenda Shaffer, Energy Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 32–33.  
21 Jeff D. Colgan, “Fueling the Fire: Pathways from Oil to War,” International Security 38, no. 2 (Fall 
2013): 161, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00135. 
22 Ibid., 161. 
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ominous-sounding ills, such as the resource curse and the Dutch Disease. Analyses of 
these phenomena understandably focus on domestic characteristics that can lead to such 
destructive behaviors. However, with wise management, producer states can use their 
resource income to shore up economic power, although avoiding the resource curse 
remains a challenge. Luong and Weinthal argue that the resource curse is not a 
predetermined fate after examining Russia and the post-Soviet Central Asian states. 
Notably, Kazakhstan and Russia, by allowing foreign private ownership of parts of their 
petroleum industry, bucked widespread expectations of poor fiscal policymaking and 
economically outperformed resource-poor post-Soviet republics, at least until 2005, the 
end of their analysis’ timeframe.23 Clawson points to the successes among the Gulf 
States in raising their respective national prestige and standards of living as proof that 
black gold does not always have to lead down a dark path, with the caveat that escaping 
the curse requires “incredibly huge amounts” of the resource.24 Engen, Langhelle, and 
Bratvold caution that even in Norway, the poster child of a state that has successfully 
avoided the pitfalls commonly associated with oil and gas and built a vibrant and 
respected economy, the deeply embedded petroleum-industrial complex may yet pull it 
back onto the development trajectory of a typical petrostate.25 
Two gaps are evident in the literature. First, although there are examples of small 
producer states attempting, with limited success, to gain geopolitical power through the 
use of energy weapons or export revenue, it is rare to find in-depth analyses of how a 
nation converts natural resources into geopolitical power, especially vis-à-vis the major 
states. Second, the discussion of natural resources and power center almost exclusively 
on oil and gas, neglecting other resources that may become critical as the future of the 
world’s energy and material needs evolve. 
                                                 
23 Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, Oil is not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions 
in Soviet Successor States (New York: Cambridge University Press: 2010), 32–33, 34.  
24 Patrick Clawson, “Sometimes the Grass Is Indeed Greener: The Successful Use of Energy 
Revenues,” in Beyond the Resource Curse, ed. Brenda Shaffer and Taleh Ziyadov (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 58, 81–82.  
25 Ole Andreas Engen, Oluf Langhelle, and Reidar Bratvold, “Is Norway Really Norway?,” in Beyond 
the Resource Curse, ed. Brenda Shaffer and Taleh Ziyadov (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2012), 278–279. 
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c. Middle Powers 
Middle powers have attracted limited attention in international relations theory, 
but, in recent decades, it has become very difficult to fully understand global affairs 
without acknowledging their important role. Despite the lower level of interest, this state 
category is not a new concept. Holbraad cites Botero, who wrote in 1589, “Middle-sized 
states are the most lasting…exposed neither to violence by their weakness nor to envy by 
their greatness.”26 Still, traditional theorists, such as Organski and Deutsch, who have 
focused primarily on the agency of major powers, argue that the actions of these lesser 
states have relatively little effect on world politics, while the stronger states get their 
way.27 Yet Sullivan disagrees with this worldview of “bigness means influence,” citing 
Morgenthau in stating that “the relative influence of the different factors upon national 
power must be determined with regard to all nations,” since factors such as atomic 
energy, industrialization, and internal military balancing may disrupt the realist hierarchy 
within the international order.28 
The definition of a middle power is far from settled. Handel attempts both a 
qualitative and quantitative approach. He first defines middle powers as relatively weak 
states whose “foreign policy is governed by the policy of others … [since] the 
international system leaves them less room for choice in the decision-making process 
[and] greater preoccupation with survival.”29 He also divides middle powers into those 
with small populations but developed economies and those with a large population but 
less development; however, he concedes that it is difficult to agree on which states 
belong in this category, as different scholars choose various problematic boundaries.30 
Instead of using quantitative criteria, Keohane prefers to define middle powers as “a state 
whose leaders consider that it cannot act effectively by itself, but may have a systemic 
                                                 
26 Holbraad, Middle Powers, 11–12. 
27 Michael P. Sullivan, Power in Contemporary International Politics (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1990), 76.  
28 Ibid., 76, 77. 
29 Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (Totowa, NJ: Frank Cass, 1981), 4, 3.  
30 Ibid., 23, 24, 28.  
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impact in a small group or through an international institution”: that is, they are “system-
affecting states.”31  
The importance of studying middle powers is evident through other, more 
relational definitions of this category of states. Handel adds the requirement that major 
powers have to take middle powers into account in their decision making.32 Holbraad 
similarly affirms the influence of middle powers, which are “states that are weaker than 
the great powers in the system but significantly stronger than the minor powers and small 
states with which they normally interact.”33 Holbraad also points out that middle powers’ 
“role in international politics appears to have become more important” since the later 
years of the Cold War.34 
d. Geoeconomics 
Luttwak’s pioneering of the field of geoeconomics introduced a new international 
relations paradigm at the end of the Cold War. Recognizing the “[reduced] importance of 
military power in world affairs” but at the same time unconvinced by the new optimism 
that “the methods of commerce” have taken over, Luttwak argues that the logic of 
conflict has not gone by the wayside.35 States and blocs of states, rather than purely 
economic entities such as corporations, remain the primary political actors on the 
international scene. The former are “inclined to strive for relative advantage against like 
entities,” while the latter primarily follow the logic of commerce. Therefore, Luttwak 
sees the emergence of “geo-economics,” a new hybrid worldview that combines elements 
of realist competition and economic interdependence, or as he puts it: “the logic of war in 
the grammar of commerce.”36 Whereas, in the past, a state’s strategic priorities 
overshadowed commerce, such as when the United States and Western Europe 
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suppressed their conflicting economic interests for the sake of maintaining the anti-Soviet 
alliance, nowadays political interventions are no longer motivated by an overarching fear 
of a common enemy and are thus insufficient to contain economic quarrels.37 
Building on Luttwak’s suggestion that different states take on a wide range of 
geo-economic behaviors, Wigell proposes conceptualizing geoeconomic strategies into 
four ideal-types, which are categorized along the two axes of strategic frame and 
economic power (Figure 1): neo-imperialism, neo-mercantilism, hegemony, and liberal 
institutionalism.38 A full discussion of each ideal-type is outside the scope of this thesis, 
but it is relevant to note that Wigell’s formulation supposes that regional powers who 
“seldom possess the necessary military power” to achieve their strategic goals through 
force are especially attracted to these ideal-types, and it is unlikely they they would 
pursue just one strategy.39  
 
Figure 1.  Regional powers’ geoeconomics strategies40 
                                                 
37 Luttwak, “From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics,” 20.  
38 Ibid., 21; Mikael Wigell, “Conceptualizing Regional Powers’ Geoeconomic Strategies: Neo-
Imperialism, Neo-Mercantilism, Hegemony, and Liberal Institutionalism,” Asia Europe Journal 14 (2016): 
135, doi:10.1007/s10308-015-0442-x.   
39 Wigell, “Conceptualizing Regional Powers’ Geoeconomic Strategies,” 146, 137.  
40 Source: Wigell, “Conceptualizing Regional Powers’ Geoeconomic Strategies,” 141. 
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In another recent work that more concretely lays out the geoeconomic strategies 
that rising states adopt, Blackwill and Harris argue that in the post-Cold War world, this 
form of statecraft has become more effective than geopolitics as traditionally 
understood.41 Geoeconomics essentially views the economic behaviors of a state within 
the larger context of its power, and this approach to gaining power is advantageous in 
that, unlike the traditional zero-sum logic of geopolitics, geoeconomics allows for win-
win results.42 The new logic of geoeconomics allows states traditionally seen as small or 
weak to rise peacefully and even prosper at a level that is disproportionate to their 
apparent size and capability, without threatening the major powers or upending the 
international system.43 Thus, rising powers are increasingly choosing economic 
instruments, including positive inducements, punitive measures, or both, as the first resort 
in formulating foreign policy and projecting influence in the world.44  
Several factors have driven rising states away from resorting to violent conflict 
over the past several decades. First, it remains very difficult for smaller states to 
challenge the military primacy of major powers in a large-scale conflict, thus forcing 
them to either cooperate or compete in other realms. Second, major powers’ military 
misadventures in various parts of the world, especially the United States in Vietnam and 
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, have demonstrated that armed conflicts can quickly 
become political and economic quagmires, with exorbitant costs far outweighing any 
minor gains. Lastly, the example of China’s rapid and largely peaceful rise has shown 
that rising states can use geoeconomic tools to both pursue strategic goals and counter the 
actions of adversaries.45  
Blackwill and Harris further argue that the main mechanism that facilitates the 
implementation of effective geoeconomics strategies is modern state capitalism. Not 
surprisingly, the states that are most likely to wield economics as a foreign policy 
                                                 
41 Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2016), 20. 
42 Ibid., 24.  
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instrument are also the ones that directly control a greater quantity of natural resources. 
For example, by 2016, governments owned the thirteen largest oil and gas companies in 
the world, comprising 75 percent of global energy reserves. Some of the operators of 
these state-owned enterprises have become wealthier, more sophisticated, and more 
internationally savvy than their predecessors, and they represent new policy options for 
rising powers. This increasing state ownership within a more integrated global market has 
given the state a new foreign policy tool and, where such state enterprises already existed, 
deepened the mutual dependence of a state’s foreign policy and economic forces.46 
2. The Case of Kazakhstan 
While there is a significant amount of scholarship on Kazakhstan, most of the 
research lacks the Central Asian state’s perspective on foreign policy development. This 
thesis draws on both scholarly work and Nazarbayev’s biographies to explain why 
Kazakhstan searches for international power and how it accomplishes that goal using 
geoeconomic strategies. 
Cummings points out that “most analyses of Central Asian foreign policy 
behavior have emphasized either domestic factors … or the international system … Few 
studies have as yet provided in-depth understandings of how elites make foreign policies 
and what sort of factors and processes go into that decision-making.”47 Indeed, scholars 
have extensively documented the motivations of Russia, China, and the West in Central 
Asia through the lens of a new “Great Game” between the great powers for natural 
resources and geopolitical positioning.48 While agreeing with Cummings that “internal 
politics cannot be understood without reference to the outside world,” this thesis will 
focus on the perspective of Kazakhstan looking outward.49  
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Western scholars are tempted to zoom in on Kazakhstan’s institutional failures 
without fully consider the challenges that the state has overcome and its aspirations on 
the world stage. Part of this bias is ideological; like other post-Soviet states, at the core of 
Kazakhstan’s government and policymaking is a supra-presidential regime, which is 
antithetical to western democracy. Cummings characterizes the first decade of the 
Nazarbayev presidency as overly focused on state- and institution-building; managerial 
and lacking a clear ideology; kleptocratic; and overpowered by personalities, corruption, 
and patrimonialism.50 Olcott places the blame for Kazakhstan’s problems squarely on the 
shoulders of the leadership, believing that the nation’s problems were not its destiny but 
arose from a lack of self-discipline at the top.51 This common view among western 
scholars marginalizes the perspective of “the man in the arena” in favor of third party 
judgment based on western standards of governance. Yet the story of a people is based 
more on subjective narratives than objective evaluations, and thus this thesis will also 
take into account both Aitken’s biography of Nazarbayev and the president’s own 
memoir as windows into the mindset and experiences that led to the decisions that set 
Kazakhstan on its pursuit of power.52 
a. Kazakhstan’s Search for Power 
Kazakhstan’s Soviet history and geopolitical position after the unexpected 
collapse of the Soviet Union are crucial in understanding Nazarbayev’s motivation for 
securing power for his young nation. Chapter Two contains a fuller accounting of the 
history, which is well-documented, but it is worth noting here that there is broad 
agreement in both historical and contemporary literature on the Kazakhstan-Russia 
relationship’s paradoxical nature. Namely, Kazakhstan is closely tied to Russia through 
shared history, culture, and geography, but it also very much desires to gain more 
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independence and pull away from Russia’s sphere of influence.53 Hoffman observes that 
“no relationship is more critical to Kazakhstan than that with Russia,” due to intertwined 
legacies from a shared history, a long border, and security arrangements binding the two 
together.54 Nevertheless, Cummings points out that Kazakhstan “should be viewed as a 
Eurasian territory with a longtime—and enduring—subjugation to or dependence on 
Russia.”55 Yet, while governing “the only Soviet republic in which the titular nationality 
was a minority population,” Nazarbayev understandably wanted to establish a sense of 
national identity in earnest, separate from the Russian connection.56 
b. Kazakhstan’s Use of Resources to Gain Power 
Oil is undoubtedly Kazakhstan’s most abundant and lucrative resource, but there 
is a long road between possessing it and profiting from it, much less deriving power from 
it. While many scholars characterize Kazakhstan as being trapped by its isolated 
geography, some argue that it has managed to overcome this weakness through the 
process of developing its oil. 
Olcott best summarizes a common description of Kazakhstan’s tangible 
endowments: “blessed by resources but cursed by geography.”57 Khanna observes that 
even Kazakhs themselves consider their location on earth as “cursed,” and believe that 
their abundant natural resources have only made the country a target of foreign 
exploitation.58 However, Cummings argues that Nazarbayev has managed to turn this 
curse into a blessing by using Kazakhstan’s isolated, but strategically significant, 
geography to forge ties with multiple major powers as part of his oft-mentioned “multi-
vector” foreign policy. Kazakhstan has used proximity to maintain a close relationship 
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with Russia, especially in the security realm, while also obtaining economic assistance 
from China. It has also portrayed itself as a Eurasian transit corridor, which connects the 
East and West but is bound by neither.59 There is little doubt, however, that the primary 
means with which Nazarbayev has been able to grow Kazakhstan’s economy is the 
country’s vast amounts of oil. 
c. Oil and Pipelines, but What Else? 
The literature on Kazakhstan’s fossil fuel and foreign policy breaks down into two 
camps. The majority of scholarship focuses on the great powers’ interests in dealing with 
Kazakhstan. Other than Russia, China has quickly risen to the top of the pile of foreign 
exploiters. Lanteigne outlines China’s aggressive investment strategy in Central Asia in 
general, and in Kazakhstan specifically, due to Beijing’s view of the region as “a vital 
secondary source of energy [that poses] fewer security risks than maritime imports.”60  
On the other hand, an emerging camp is arguing in favor of Kazakhstan’s agency 
and leverage in its relationship with more powerful states. Cooley argues that “Central 
Asian states … are not passive pawns in the strategic maneuverings of the great powers, 
but important actors in their own right,” and observers should acknowledge their 
“considerable agency … in dealing with their geopolitical suitors.”61 Overland and 
Torjesen challenge the traditional understanding of Russia’s imperial relationship with 
Kazakhstan, arguing that “while Kazakhstan has chosen to establish a close and 
cooperative relationship with Russia, it has also proactively and assertively defended its 
own national interests vis-à-vis Russia.”62 Kennedy also argues that it would be a 
mistake to assume that Kazakhstan is in the exploited position as a resource producer, 
noting both its continued drive to diversify its portfolio of export customers, maintain 
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traditional relationship with Russia and building new ones with Iran.63 In the process, 
Kazakhstan has managed to extract overpayments from the eager Chinese while staving 
off dominance by either China or Russia and increasing its own state control over 
resources.64 
The most striking observation when surveying the literature on the role that 
natural resources play in national policies and geopolitical power in Kazakhstan is the 
near complete emphasis on oil, gas, and pipelines. Although Olcott mentions that 
Kazakhstan has “substantial gold deposits and rich unmined veins of copper, chrome, and 
aluminum,” not to mention its current position as the top exporter of uranium, almost all 
analyses completely ignore all resources except oil and gas.65 This gap is understandable, 
but one that this thesis aims to address by examining Kazakhstan’s uranium industry. 
C. HYPOTHESES 
The two primary sources of power in traditional international relations theory are 
military might and economic strength, so they form the two broad hypotheses that this 
thesis examines. 
(1) Kazakhstan Has Built Geopolitical Power by Strengthening its Military 
Realists would expect that a newly independent Kazakhstan would quickly build 
up a strong military or form close alliances to defend its long borders against the 
surrounding major powers. Yet, Kazakhstan has eschewed gaining security and power 
through military means. The Kazakhstani military’s size is small for a country with 
international ambitions, which borders potential adversaries, both larger and smaller, on 
all sides. The most notable argument against the military-for-power hypothesis is that 
Kazakhstan willingly relinquished its large store of nuclear weapons after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, during a time when minor powers in the South Asia and Middle East were 
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actively pursuing the technology, both as a deterrent against larger powers and as a 
symbol of prestige. That Nazarbayev, who desires international respect, would 
voluntarily give up such a ready instrument of power is a strong indication that he 
envisioned a different path to prominence for Kazakhstan, based on peaceful economic 
development and diplomacy. 
Few scholars mention the military as a significant source of power for 
Kazakhstan, and reasonably so. In an effort to secure its borders and establish sovereignty 
after independence, Kazakhstan did build up a military force that could nominally guard 
its long borders; however, even by 2010, Kazakhstan’s military totaled only around fifty 
thousand troops.66 Other than the nuclear warheads and missiles that garnered 
international attention in the early 1990s, most authors, including those of Nazarbayev’s 
biographies, do not even mention the Kazakhstani military in their analyses of its foreign 
policy. This is a very curious but telling statement on the military’s diminished role in 
this former Soviet republic.67 
(2) Kazakhstan Has Built State Power through Geoeconomic Means 
Nazarbayev believes that strengthening the economy, rather than the military, is 
the best way for Kazakhstan to secure independence and build international power.68 
This thesis argues that, to this end, Kazakhstan has employed four strategies, which 
leverage natural resource wealth or geographical positioning between major powers in 
different ways: 
1. Using business deals to strengthen the regime 
For regimes that practice modern state capitalism, having their own state 
enterprises form business ties can be a useful political tool. This is especially true when 
the other negotiating party is also a state-owned enterprise with direct connection to its 
ruling regime, since both parties are keen to use business deals to serve political 
purposes, in addition to economic ones. 
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There are several ways that business deals can strengthen the regime. The most 
direct way is bringing in capital, which enriches the regime and its supporters and funds 
the state apparatus, including internal security institutions, that keep the regime in power. 
However, business ties can also serve diplomatic purposes, which are directly relevant to 
building international power. Commercial ties between the parties involved in the deal 
making—especially between their state-owned enterprises—are a gateway to closer 
diplomatic partnerships. To third party observers, such deals are also signals of the 
regime’s economic health and political trustworthiness, which can translate into 
international recognition and more business and diplomatic connections. Building on 
these ties is thus a tool to gain prestige, credibility, and ultimately the ability to 
effectively conduct foreign policy. 
Regimes can use business deals as bargaining chips that incentivize desired 
political behaviors and enhance its relative power vis-à-vis a target government. This 
power imbalance may even apply to other negotiations over matters unrelated to the said 
commercial venture. This process is more straightforward between state-owned 
enterprises, which can act as proxies for the regimes’ political goals. In the case of 
dealing with private firms, the acting regime could withhold completing a business deal 
as a way of messaging to the target government. Acting on its own interests, the private 
firms may leverage political influence and push its own government into complying with 
the acting regime’s goals. This method is not limited to any economic sector, so long as 
the private firms involved factor significantly in the target government’s political 
calculus. In this way, a commercial relationship could also be a means for the regime to 
achieve non-commercial objectives. 
2. Exploiting geographical positioning between major powers 
Traditionally, being located between major powers is a distinct disadvantage, as it 
means being under constant threat from multiple sides. This is no longer the case from a 
geoeconomic perspective, since there is less incentive to inflict violence against 
neighboring states; in fact, from a purely economic point of view, geographical proximity 
with multiple large economies is the basis for a multilateral win-win arrangement, as it 
lowers the transportation costs between several trading partners. 
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Mere possession of resources is not enough to generate revenue; there must also 
be ways to get the products to market, and it is most convenient if the buyers are right 
next door. In terms of transportation logistics, not all resources are equal, and proximity 
may be more important for the sale of some resources than others, especially when 
considering the need to construct the transport medium. For example, the most efficient 
way to transport oil and gas is through pipelines, which are expensive to build, especially 
over long distances and difficult terrain or volatile areas. On the other hand, coal or other 
solid minerals can be transported over existing roads and railroads. Thus, having a ready 
market just across the border is more economically beneficial for selling oil and gas. 
For states that have neither raw materials nor manufactured products to sell, 
geographical connectedness to producers and consumers is itself a potentially lucrative 
source of revenue through the collection of transit fees. In an era of almost instantaneous 
transfer of information over the worldwide web, most commercial products still require 
physical transportation over long geographical distances, reliable intermediaries, and safe 
passage. Therefore, “centrality as a transit point” between producers and markets 
becomes a useful asset that a state can wield as influence.69 In practice, a centrally 
located state can impose customs and transit tariffs to raise revenue or allow passage in 
exchange for other concessions. Geography can also be leveraged punitively. By 
threatening to deny transit across its territory, a regime could raise the transaction cost for 
market players to the point where they would capitulate to its demands. 
3. Leveraging consumer states’ dependence on foreign mineral resources 
The evolving geoeconomic behavior of rising states is disrupting the traditional 
view that the relationship between the developed and developing world is one of 
domineering exploitation, on the part of the more developed states. In the modern 
international arena, based more on interdependent commercial ties than conquest and 
colonization, producer states can take advantage of larger consumer states’ need for 
resources to build up their relative power. If a larger state does not possess or produce 
enough mineral resources to be self-sufficient, then it is dependent on foreign imports to 
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fuel its military, sustain or grow its economy, and maintain the ruling regime’s hold on 
power. When resource acquisition by force is off the table, this dynamic puts a 
disproportionate amount of influence in the hands of smaller producer states vis-à-vis 
states that are traditionally considered more powerful. Although large producer countries 
such as Russia have often exercised this capability in a coercive fashion to mixed results, 
some smaller producer states have more shrewdly and successfully utilized their mineral 
resources. For example, rather than openly antagonizing other states through the 
aggressive use of energy weapons, some post-Soviet republics have welcomed consumer 
states from around the globe to partake in their resource feast.70 This way, smaller 
producer states gain reliable sources of income and influence, as the larger consumer 
states are dependent on the continuing trade relationship and more likely to be amenable 
on other issues to avoid disruptions to vital resource supplies. 
4. Using resource rents to strengthen the domestic economy 
An important lesson, even for autocratic regimes that aspire to little more than 
staying in power, is that their rule depends on domestic legitimacy, which rests heavily 
on economic stability and employment opportunities for the population. To that end, 
rentier states may turn to a variety of economic instruments, including sovereign wealth 
funds and state-owned enterprises as vehicles for shoring up their economies, with the 
ultimate goal of ensuring regime survival through legitimization in the eyes of both the 
domestic population and the international community. 
Sovereign wealth funds (SWF) are effectively state-owned holding companies, 
and they have become a favorite financial management vehicle for rentier states to 
achieve economic stability. In mid-2013, these state-sponsored capital pools were 
estimated to hold “between $3 trillion and $5.9 trillion of assets” worldwide, compared 
with $2.4 trillion held by private hedge funds.71 SWFs hold ownership in state-owned 
enterprises, indirectly employing a large number of citizens, and serve as a financial 
buffer for the purpose of providing social welfare and reacting to economic volatility. 
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Often professionally managed, these funds are usually driven by profit motives, although 
they also serve the political purpose of strengthening the state’s legitimacy by building up 
the population’s confidence in the regime’s ability to rule.72 Over the last two decades, 
state-owned enterprises around the world that convert resources into revenue have 
transformed from mere “domestic employment vehicles” to some of the world’s largest 
corporations, backed by immense state-owned capital. While they retain the undesirable 
feature of being much less efficient than private firms, they are nonetheless useful as 
politically pliant and dependable sources of employment.73 
Rentier states that are successful in developing their economy also tend to divest 
revenue from natural resource production into other sectors. This economic 
diversification is an important hedge against the volatility of the commodities market and 
is another method to ensure economic stability in the long run. Regimes may employ 
SWFs for this purpose by injecting rent revenue into an SWF and then using its function 
as a holding company to invest in other state or privately owned enterprises, but this type 
of investment alone is not enough for diversification. Since initially the state’s revenue 
stream is most heavily dependent on natural resource production, most likely the heaviest 
investments in infrastructure, technology, and education are geared toward fulfilling the 
requirements of that industry. However, to successfully diversify the economy, the state 
must also invest in similar areas of other industries, rather than simply pumping capital 
into firms. To deal with the lack of experience in these other nascent industries, the state 
may seek to employ foreign experts or purchase foreign technologies and, ideally, 
simultaneously invest in the training of a domestic workforce that will one day be able to 
take over management and operations. 
Once a regime has stabilized the domestic economy through proper investment, 
development, and diversification strategies, it can tout its achievements and gain some 
important foreign policy assets: international recognition and independence. A measure 
of respect as a capable ruling regime means less scrutiny of its actions, and without 
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having to rely on foreign financial assistance, the state can strike out on its own and 
freely conduct its international affairs.74 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis evaluates Kazakhstan’s geoeconomic strategies as a pathway to power, 
focusing on the two cases of oil and uranium. Since there is a gap in the literature 
regarding the application of geoeconomics to middle powers, this thesis also builds on the 
theory by applying geoeconomics to Kazakhstan. The utility of this exercise is multi-
dimensional, at once examining how a middle power uses its resources to gain power 
while also addressing a gap in the literature regarding nations leveraging natural 
resources other than oil and gas for power. 
The single case of Kazakhstan is appropriate for the scope of this thesis, given the 
space limitation and the expansive amount of information to cover. This thesis focuses on 
Kazakhstan for several reasons. First, Kazakhstan is located at the Eurasian intersection 
between several major powers of high interest to international relations theory: its former 
master Russia, a rapidly rising China, and an uncertain West. Kazakhstan’s relationship 
with all of these players presents an illustrative look at how states behave in the 
multipolar world. Second, Kazakhstan has been unusually successful among post-Soviet 
republics in both economic development and building international power and 
recognition, especially compared with other Central Asian states such as Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan, which are also endowed with natural resources. Kazakhstan’s successes 
and pitfalls could serve as a model or caution for other rising states. Third, the 
comparison between Kazakhstan’s oil and uranium industries allows for an observation 
on whether geoeconomic strategies can apply to non-hydrocarbon resources that feature 
much less extensively in the resource politics literature. Finally, uranium receives 
attention in the political science field mostly as nuclear weapons material, while its status 
as a non-fossil fuel energy source that emits little greenhouse gas may raise its 
importance in the years to come.  
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This thesis references a range of source material. Nazarbayev’s biographies give 
indications of the aspirational aims, national identity, and philosophical directions that 
constitutes Kazakhstan’s policies and goals. Works on the history of Kazakhstan’s oil and 
pipeline industry will inform the dynamics of its resource use, with current news articles 
supplementing with more updated information. Information regarding Kazakhstan’s 
uranium industry and its connection with national power will come from industry reports, 
including production data, and news reports on recent trends. While the literature has 
documented Kazakhstan’s oil and pipeline industries and their contribution to national 
power, few have explored the connection between the uranium industry and power. 
Based on existing Kazakhstani attitudes, policies, and institutions, this thesis will 
triangulate on the nature of this nexus and project Kazakhstan’s future behavior toward 
the uranium resource market.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis contains five chapters. Following this introduction, the second chapter 
presents a brief historical overview of Kazakhstan, focusing on its relationship with 
Russia before and during the Soviet period to contextualize Nazarbayev’s later policy 
choices. 
Chapter III explains why Kazakhstan turned away from the realist logic of using 
military strength to achieve security, which should be a state’s ultimate goal. This choice 
was rooted in Kazakhstan’s history as the abused testing ground of Soviet weapons 
programs. The chapter also explores how Kazakhstan uses its military and security 
alliances, not as means of violence but means of building diplomatic ties. 
Chapter IV, on Kazakhstan’s oil, pipeline, and the uranium industries, is the crux 
of the thesis. This chapter is an account of the strategies that Nazarbayev employed to 
turn Kazakhstan’s mineral resources and geography into sources of power. A detailed 
analysis of the politics, business deals, challenges, and how Kazakhstan uses its mineral 
resources to build power results in the bulk of the answer to the research question. The oil 
and the uranium sections are similar in their common aim to study the connection 
between Kazakhstan’s mineral industries and its power-building policymaking. However, 
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since the analysis of the uranium case within the existing literature is rare, the uranium 
section draws on the framework learned through studying the oil industry to reach an 
informed conclusion. 
Finally, the concluding chapter brings together the knowledge gained through the 
thesis. The chapter evaluates the thesis’s contributions to the middle power and natural 
resource literatures. Looking forward, the chapter also considers policy implications for 
the U.S.–Kazakhstan relationship, lays out some serious challenges that still face 
Kazakhstan and Nazarbayev, and recommends future research directions. 
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II. BACKGROUND: A BRIEF HISTORY ON THE STEPPES 
A visit into Kazakhstan’s past is necessary to understand Nazarbayev’s drive to 
blaze his own trail on the international stage and the policy choices he has undertaken. A 
remote yet vulnerable geography, the lack of unifying national identity, and subjugation 
under foreign powers are several interrelated and mutually reinforcing challenges that 
have dominated Kazakhstan’s history, and, for Nazarbayev to succeed, he had to 
overcome, or at least manage, all of them. 
A. GEOGRAPHY 
For most of its history, geography has isolated much of Central Asia from the 
outside world. This landlocked region, within which Kazakhstan is the largest country in 
the modern era, is “enclosed by mountains on its east and south, by desert and arid steppe 
along most of the northern areas, and by the Caspian Sea on the west.”75 The Dzungarian 
gate, located in northeastern Kazakhstan, has historically been a transit corridor, serving 
as the lifeline of the region by bringing in nomadic herders and trading caravans along 
the Silk Road, but also as the spillway through which foreign conquerors poured onto the 
steppes.76 
The remoteness of the Kazakh steppe has not created a united identity among its 
inhabitants. Situated along both trade routes and conquered plains, Central Asia has taken 
on multiple overlapping cultural layers, including the Turko–Persian, the Islamic, and 
later the Mongolian. Political divisiveness has been the norm, except for the short-lived 
political unity under the Mongols until Genghiz Khan divided the region into vassal 
states for his sons prior to his death in 1227 AD. As a result, each era of various dominant 
cultures left behind a palimpsest of influence but not a definitive identity.77 
Subjugation under foreign powers has been a constant reality for Kazakhs. The 
most recent iteration came with imperial Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
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centuries. In perhaps a foreshadowing of Nazarbayev’s balancing approach to foreign 
policy, the Russians first gained significant influence during their expansion south- and 
eastward into Central Asia when Kazakh tribes sought their protection from the eastern 
Dzhungarian Oirat tribes between 1680 and 1760. By the early nineteenth century, the 
Russian Empire had incorporated most of the Kazakh tribes, and mutual ties grew with 
increasing trade between the two cultures.78  
B. UNDER THE TSARS AND SOVIETS 
Russian, and later the Soviet Union, came to embody all three thematic challenges 
that have long faced the Kazakhs. The 4,253 mile (6,846 km) long Kazakhstan-Russian 
border—“the longest single-segment land border in the world”—made establishing trade 
connections easier, but maintaining comprehensive border controls more difficult.79 As is 
true for all countries, “[they] can choose their friends but not their neighbors.”80 The 
status and identity of the Kazakh people under Russian rule was constantly in flux. When 
the khans (chieftains) of the Small and Middle Kazakh Zhuzes (commonly termed hordes, 
or large tribal groups) swore allegiance to the Russian tsars in 1731 and 1740, they did 
not anticipate the level of colonization and intermixing that would occur as a 
protectorate.81 For its part, the Russian Empire ruled pragmatically through local 
authorities rather than directly. In the process, the empire empowered a class of local 
elites with entrenched interests in the political culture, even to the present day.82  
The Russian empire, and the Soviet Union initially, ruled the whole of Central 
Asia as a massive region called Turkestan. The modern republic of Kazakhstan did not 
come to be until the Soviet program of “National-Territorial Delimitation” between 1924 
and 1936, when the Soviet Union divided itself into 15 republics, each named after the 
titular ethnic group. For the first time in Central Asia, territorial and ethnic borders 
became officially congruent, and by the end of the 1920s, the Soviets had allowed for 
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childhood education in the population’s national language, although Russian remained 
the lingua franca among the republics. However, instead of a empowering project, this 
was actually a Bolshevik plan to use ethnicity for the purpose of socio-political 
transformation. By officially designating ethnic groups, the Soviets could distribute 
goods and resources, including employment, to more favored groups. By separating 
similar regional ethnicities with territorial borders and co-opting the participation of local 
elites within those boundaries, the Soviets implemented a “divide-and-rule” policy that 
preempted wider pan-identity—such as pan-Turkism or all-Muslim—agitation.83 
Nazarbayev’s decision to distance Kazakhstan from Russia after independence is 
understandable against the backdrop of decades spent within the Soviet Union and under 
Moscow’s thumb. The Kazakhs have had longstanding grievances against their Russian 
overlords. In the 1890s, policies favoring ethnic Russians settlers over Kazakh nomads in 
the redistribution of fertile land led to widespread famine. Following a 1916 anti-Russian 
uprising, the deportation of “hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs” caused another similar 
tragedy.84 Yet, if life under Russian imperial rule was harsh, Soviet governance was 
downright catastrophic. Inside the Soviet machine, Kazakhstan’s role was “a supplier of 
raw materials, foodstuffs, and military production.”85 In the early 1930s, Stalin’s terror 
famine (голодомор) and agricultural collectivization policies wiped out four to six 
million Kazakhs, or a quarter of Kazakhstan’s population.86 During Stalin’s purges, 
Kazakhstan became the dumping ground of undesirables; ethnic minorities and those 
considered political threats to Stalin’s stranglehold on power were exiled en masse to the 
desolate steppes of the far away hinterland, where they had nowhere to run and could 
cause no problems. In the 1960s, Khrushchev’s Virgin Lands agricultural programs 
meant to jumpstart the food production industry by turning the Kazakh steppe into the 
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“Soviet Union’s breadbasket.”87 The project ended in failure due to the gross 
mismanagement of Kazakhstan’s natural resources and human capital. 
The untapped wealth of fossil-fuel reserves and deposits of various minerals in 
Kazakhstan could have powered a much more robust economy. Indeed, Soviet geologists 
had boasted that “Kazakhstan was capable of exporting the entire periodic table of 
elements.”88 Yet such economic expansion was not to be, as Moscow remotely 
micromanaged Central Asia’s economies through a “spoke and wheel” model that linked 
each republic directly to the faraway center of Soviet power, but not with other potential 
regional and international trading partners. The Kazakhstani fossil fuel industry under the 
Soviets most clearly illustrated this relationship: Moscow deliberately prohibited 
Kazakhstan from refining its own crude oil, forcing all oil and gas pipelines to transit 
northbound through Russian territory instead of more directly to other regional 
markets.89 Such forced dependency crippled economic development in the region, and 
Kazakhstan had little choice but to give up its natural resources without receiving a 
commensurate return in investment.90 
Besides political and economic subjugation, Moscow also decided to ravage 
Kazakh land through its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons development and 
testing programs. This dark period in Kazakhstan’s history will receive a fuller treatment 
in the next chapter on Kazakhstan’s security policies, but it suffices to say that the 
Kazakh experience with Soviet weapons programs had a large impact in shaping 
Nazarbayev’s choice to marginalize military strength as a source of building power. 
C. AFTER INDEPENDENCE 
For international observers in 1992, Kazakhstan’s current success would have 
been nothing short of astonishing. The nascent state appeared to be heading toward 
implosion under the combined stress of hyperinflation (reaching a height of 2,600 percent 
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per annum), unsecured borders, a diplomatically hostile Moscow, and national identity 
crisis.91 Many Russians, perhaps justifiably, did not even consider Kazakhstan to be a 
true nation-state. By the 1980s, ethnic Kazakhs made up only 29 percent of the 
population, while Russians were the largest group at 34 percent.92 More than two million 
ethnic Russians and 400,000 Germans, fearing economic ruin and Kazakh domination, 
departed soon after independence, taking with them technical and managerial expertise. 
The remainder of the population consisted of “over 50 other nationalities,” mostly groups 
that were exiled or transplanted during Stalin’s purges and then Khrushchev’s Virgin 
Lands policies.93 North of the border, Russian calls to re-absorb at least parts of 
Kazakhstan into a new Soviet Union came from both the right-wing politician Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky and the venerated activist writer Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, who himself had 
endured a stint in a Kazakhstani Gulag.94 Internally, nationalist voices sought to create a 
constitution that gave full political rights to only native Kazakhs.95 From both within and 
without, Kazakhstan faced a real possibility of disintegrating. 
Remarkably, the new president Nazarbayev—an ethnic Kazakh and former Soviet 
apparatchik—resisted the pull toward either extreme and set out to build legitimacy 
around a new national identity and political framework, strengthening his presidential 
regime in the process. At home, concerned about risking a major schism in public 
opinion, he ceded a political victory in 1993 to the Parliament in the debate over the new 
constitution. Yet he also turned the defeat into a public relations boost by placing the 
responsibility on the Parliament for failing to include more civil rights protection in the 
document.96 In an effort to hold together the Kazakhstani “ethnic mosaic” in the face of 
the massive Russian and German exodus, he championed a pan-Kazakhstani identity over 
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individual ethnic group loyalties, even rebuking his staff members for placing too much 
weight on ethnic origins.97  
Nevertheless, displays of nationalist unity were insufficient to hold Kazakhstan 
together without arresting the freefalling economy, and on this front, Kazakhstan’s 
success has shifted both the economic and geopolitical landscape of Central Asia. In the 
early 1990s, over 90 percent of Kazakhstan’s trade was with Russia, and the ruble was 
still the official currency.98 This disproportionate dependence on Russia presented 
significant challenges, especially while Russia was itself battling economic troubles at 
home. Gosbank, the Russian state bank, had a monopoly on printing ruble bank notes, 
and sustaining Kazakhstan’s cash flow was low on the bank’s priority list. Without a 
reliable money supply, the Kazakhstani government faced widespread anger over 
suspended wages and pensions, while the country’s commerce and financial activities 
stalled.99 This economic crisis encouraged political opposition to Nazarbayev’s 
government, especially Kazakh nationalists who advocated policies that would have 
irritated Russia.100  
Nazarbayev implemented several measures that would have lasting effects on 
Kazakhstan’s economic and foreign policy. First, Nazarbayev was forced to depart the 
ruble zone and introduce a new currency, the tenge.101 Second, Nazarbayev established a 
group of young political and economic advisors that would bring about reforms based on 
previously radical ideas such as supply-side economics, privatization, and the free 
market.102 Finally, Russia’s general disdain of Kazakhstan and the view—not wholly 
unfair—that it was subsidizing Kazakhstan’s economy convinced Nazarbayev of the need 
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to back away from Russia’s sphere of influence without alarming Moscow, or risk falling 
back into its subservient position of the Soviet era.103 
Having experienced a history full of oppression and disappointment under 
Russian hegemony, following independence, Nazarbayev laid out a vision that aimed to 
transcend his nation’s troubled past. Instead of fighting Kazakhstan’s history and 
geography, Nazarbayev embraced and integrated them into a new strategic future, which 
he termed Eurasianism (Евразийство). At the core of this idea lies the acceptance that 
Kazakhstan is situated historically and geographically in the remote Silk Road trading 
corridor that once connected the vast expanses of Asia and Europe.104 Meanwhile, 
realizing that he is squeezed between multiple great powers, each vying for a piece of 
Kazakhstan’s resource pie, Nazarbayev advanced a “multi-vector” foreign policy that 
seeks to maintain good relations yet eschews complete alignment with—or domination 
by—any outside power.105 He aspired less to emulate the successes of the great powers 
than the economic miracle that Lee Kuan Yew was able to create in the tiny city-state of 
Singapore. Believing that there is “no one model of governance” for all nations, 
Nazarbayev proclaimed that Kazakhstan would never again be “an appendage.”106 To 
fulfill this vision, the new state first had to wrestle with a thorny vestige of its Soviet 
legacy: What was to be done with the military forces and weapons inherited from 
the empire? 
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III. MILITARY AND SECURITY: MIGHT IS NOT RIGHT 
From the realist perspective in international relations, a strong military is the 
ultimate form of power. Waltz views security as the “highest end,” while Mearsheimer 
theorizes that other forms of state power are merely “latent” in nature and serve the 
purpose of building military strength.107 This chapter demonstrates that, following 
independence, Kazakhstan chose to turn away from such a militaristic logic. This choice 
was the result of a combination of path dependency and agency, driven by pragmatism as 
much as idealism. Even though Kazakhstan was in a precarious position security-wise, its 
tragic experience as part of the Soviet Union’s weapons programs and the weakness of its 
military forces after independence encouraged Nazarbayev to deliberately de-emphasize 
an aggressive military posture as part of Kazakhstan’s strategy to gain international 
power. Through a more nuanced approach than simply choosing between aggression and 
pacifism, Kazakhstan has used its military’s non-violent participation in multiple 
international security institutions as a diplomatic tool to build multilateral ties, while 
boosting its own image as a respectable international partner in peace.  
A. A DECIMATED LAND 
Kazakhstan “suffered as a Cold War proving ground and arms depot” for the 
Soviet Union, as the Soviets spread test sites and factories for nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons across the vast and remote steppe.108 From 1949 until Gorbachev’s 
1985 unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing—an ill-fated bid to put a stop to 
Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative—the Soviet Union conducted 456 nuclear 
explosions at the test site near Semipalatinsk (present day Semey) in northeastern 
Kazakhstan, making it the Soviet equivalent to the United States’ Nevada Test Site.109 
These detonations included 86 in the air, 30 at ground surface, and 340 in underground 
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tunnels and boreholes, and fallout contamination poisoned the region, reaching as far as 
the city of Ust-Kamenogorsk, 140 miles away. Missile tests were launched from the 
Scientific Research Test Range No. 5 at Tyuratam, which became the famous Baikonur 
space complex.  
The Soviet Union’s abuse of Kazakhstani territory extended beyond the nuclear 
variety. Disregarding the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the wartime use of both 
chemical and biological weapons, and the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention, the 
Soviet Union secretly continued these types of weapons programs, often using remote 
locations in Kazakhstan as testing grounds.110 In Pavlodar, on the banks of the Irtysh 
River, a dual-purpose chemical plant stood at the ready to produce weapons in case of 
war mobilization. Biological weapons testing on Vozrozhdeniye (“Rebirth”) Island in the 
Aral Sea began as early as 1937, and testing restarted after World War II. In mid-July 
1971, following an explosive testing of “a mere 400 grams” of smallpox pathogen, a 
civilian research vessel collecting samples for ecological damage survey became 
contaminated after sailing within 15 kilometers of the island. The resulting outbreak 
killed three residents, including two infants, in nearby Aralsk.111 The Soviet military also 
produced weaponized bubonic plague at the rate of “two metric tons a year” and 
conducted testing on baboons on the island as late as 1989.112 
Following an anthrax outbreak in the Russian city of Sverdlovsk (present day 
Yekaterinburg) in April 1979, in which 40 to 60 people died, Brezhnev approved the 
relocation of the biological weapons facility to Stepnogorsk, a remote desert town in 
northern Kazakhstan.113 To guard against intrusion and contamination due to leakage, 
workers stripped the surrounding landscape of vegetation at the new facility, nine miles 
outside of town.114 At this facility, headed by Ken Alibek, an ethnic Kazakh military 
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doctor, the Soviet military manufactured weaponized anthrax that was three times more 
potent than previously achieved, at the frantic rate of two tons per day. Under the 
stressful conditions and often neglectful attitudes of superiors, workers there suffered 
from accidents that “happened every week,” including anthrax infections.115 The collapse 
of the Soviet Union left behind “tons of anthrax bacteria spores, buried on Vozrozhdeniye 
Island.”116  
Nazarbayev cites his early life experiences as formative in his distaste toward 
weapons production and testing in Kazakhstan. While working as a steelmaker in his 
youth, he traveled to an area near the Semipalatinsk Polygon test site and first became 
aware of the horror facing the local residents, almost all of whom were ethnic Kazakhs. 
Later, he struck a lifelong friendship with a fellow metallurgy student whose family lived 
at the foothills of a mountain within the testing ground. Multiple members of this family 
suffered from radiation aftereffects in the form of mental retardation, radiation sores, and 
death by leukemia.117 According to his biographer, Nazarbayev had long been 
emotionally affected by Soviet weapons testing on Kazakh land, which heavily 
influenced his decision later on as president in deciding the future course of action 
regarding these programs.118  
B. DISARMAMENT: IDEALISM OR PRAGMATISM? 
As the young country’s new ethnic Kazakh leader, Nazarbayev struggled to form 
a cohesive national identity for his fractious multiethnic population. Part of that process 
was to break with the Soviet legacy of weapons programs, which had so decimated 
Kazakhstan’s landscape and poisoned its people. After the USSR fell, Kazakhstan 
inherited was “the world’s fourth-largest…arsenal, including 104 SS-18 intercontinental 
ballistic missiles with ten warheads each.”119 Interestingly, much like Ukraine and 
Belarus, Kazakhstan received a telephone “hot line” from Russia but not the “Cheget” 
                                                 
115 Hoffman, The Dead Hand, 139, 299–300. 
116 Ibid., 400.  
117 Aitken, Nazarbayev, 130, 129. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Hoffman, The Dead Hand, 441.  
 38 
nuclear briefcase or launch authority.120 In other words, Moscow deprived the 
Kazakhstani people of both the ability to resist the harm that these weapons imposed on 
them and the authority to control their use. Thus, eliminating the weapons was a sound 
political option that would at once establish Kazakhstan’s new image as a non-nuclear 
power and unite the population behind the regime that addressed a significant historical 
collective grievance. Disarmament, it turned out, was as much a politically pragmatic 
decision as a morally idealistic one. 
Nevertheless, there were still outsized benefits to retaining the strategic nuclear 
weapons and, even if Nazarbayev himself was committed to disarmament, he understood 
Kazakhstan’s complex political position and troubled economic conditions well enough 
to tread carefully. First, Kazakhstan’s uneasy relationships and latent territorial disputes 
with neighboring nuclear powers Russia and China made nuclear weapons an attractive 
insurance policy. Second, the prestige and international standing of being a nuclear power 
was tempting to a young nation that had long experienced foreign repression and was still 
struggling to find its independent identity.121 Factional voices were also quickly 
emerging to convince Nazarbayev to take various routes with his nuclear inheritance. 
Internationally, while western countries were anxious to push Kazakhstan into giving up 
its nuclear weapons, the Arab world also sent envoys urging Nazarbayev to retain “an 
Islamic bomb,” even offering “$6 billion [U.S.] to defray the maintenance costs.”122 
Domestically, the Kazakh political elite was divided between hawks who wanted to 
permanently maintain nuclear deterrence, bargainers who saw short term retention of 
nuclear weapons as a useful currency to exchange for future security guarantees, and 
doves who “demanded immediate, unilateral, and total nuclear disarmament.”123  
To the extent that Nazarbayev personally leaned toward disarmament, he also 
behaved like a transactional politician. He admitted early on, during negotiations with 
western leaders, that even though Kazakhstan had no aspiration to join the nuclear 
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powers club, having taken into account the technical difficulties, cost, and his personal 
opposition to weapons of mass destruction, he was also unwilling to relinquish control of 
these weapons without receiving anything of value in return. His primary concern was 
security across the 3,500-mile Russian–Kazakhstani border, but he also desired 
“international recognition, respectability, [and] investment.” Turning Kazakhstan into a 
nuclear pariah ran contrary to those goals.124 In this respect, he belonged in the 
bargainers’ camp among the Kazakhstani elite.  
Negotiations over nuclear disarmament gave Kazakhstan the rare chance to build 
a different type of relationship with the West than was possible while it was a Soviet 
republic. Whereas previously the West had little regard for the entire Central Asia region 
that was hidden far behind the Iron Curtain, the threat of widespread nuclear proliferation 
out of Kazakhstan was attracting intense high-level attention, especially from the United 
States. Incidentally, Kazakhstan’s frail political and economic conditions actually worked 
to its advantage vis-à-vis the outside powers that were eager to incentivize Kazakhstan’s 
disarmament. Nazarbayev saw an opportunity to walk out of the Soviet shadow and take 
a seat at the table with leaders of major international powers. 
Fearing widespread proliferation, following this unprecedented disintegration of a 
nuclear power, American Senators Nunn and Lugar launched the very successful 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which provided funds and technical assistance to 
the struggling former Soviet republics to “cope with [their] inheritance from hell.”125 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus signed the Lisbon Protocol to the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks (START) on May 23, 1992, and Kazakhstan also joined the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear member. In December 1994, multilateral 
negotiations on Kazakhstan’s security concerns also resulted in the Budapest 
Memorandum on Security Guarantees, in which the United States, Great Britain, and 
Russia all agreed to respect Kazakhstan’s sovereign and borders and refrain from using 
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any military or economic means against the republic.126 On March 31, 1995, technicians 
dismantled the last nuclear warhead in Kazakhstan, and the country has committed to 
being nuclear-free ever since.127  
Cooperation with the West has also brought the investment and prestige that 
Nazarbayev craved. After a low-level former Soviet official disclosed to the U.S. State 
Department that 600 kilograms of 90 percent highly enriched uranium were haphazardly 
stored at a plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk, the Americans began to deliberate on possible 
options. They finally decided to launch a tiger team under the code name Project 
Sapphire to physically remove the material from the country, rather than securing it in 
place, largely because “no one knew what would happen … to Kazakhstan in a few 
years.”128 For his part, Nazarbayev’s ready agreement in allowing the operation to 
proceed, albeit discretely, earned him warm praise from President Clinton, who 
announced during a visit at the White House that the United States would triple its aid to 
the cash-strapped republic. Without officially acknowledging uranium as a prime 
impetus, more than $311 million would flow into Kazakhstan as Nazarbayev secured his 
reputation as a trustworthy ally in the nonproliferation cause. 
C. NON-AGGRESSION IN AN INSECURE WORLD 
While Kazakhstan has perceived itself to be under potential security threats from 
multiple sides, the most serious of which comes from Russia in the north, it has chosen to 
respond non-aggressively. Although Russia lacks the resources to reintegrate the Central 
Asian states under a new version of the Soviet Union, it is still committed to retaining the 
region under its traditional sphere of influence. The strategic significance of the region, in 
terms of its position as the junction between Russia and China and the “interface between 
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Russia and the Islamic world,” as well as its natural resources, guarantees that Russia will 
continue to try to retain its foothold in Central Asia.129  
Threats from other directions also worry the region’s leaders. To the east, 
although economic relationships with China have grown by leaps and bounds, the 
instability in the rebellious western Chinese province of Xinjiang and large, difficult to 
control movement of migrants across long, porous borders present security concerns. To 
the south, violent conflicts, formerly in Tajikistan and currently in Afghanistan, threaten 
to destabilize the region, although Kazakhstan has the benefit of having the other Central 
Asian republics as buffer states from the troubles in Southwest Asia.130 
Given Kazakhstan’s security challenges, one would expect the state to build a 
large conventional military, especially as it accumulated more wealth; however, 
throughout Kazakhstan’s post-Soviet history, military expenditure has remained at 
around one percent of gross domestic product (GDP).131 The total size of the Kazakhstani 
military has also remained constant over its years of development (Table 1). It is telling 
that, in both Nazarbayev’s biography and memoir, there is no glorification or even 
mention of the Kazakhstani military. This omission could be a deliberate part of 
Nazarbayev’s campaign to build his image as a leader of peace. This policy is partly 
grounded in the reality that Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states inherited only 
fragments of the former Soviet Union’s military might and thus needed much time and 
resources to improve their forces’ capabilities.132 Another significant factor discouraging 
Kazakhstan from developing a large military is the overwhelming relative strength of the 
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Russian military, which at once deters Central Asian states from assuming an aggressive 
posture and incentivizes them to depend on Russia as the regional security guarantor.133  
Table 1.   Personnel strength of Kazakhstani military services over time 
 1995134 2010135 
Army 25,000 30,000 
Navy Joint Caspian Sea flotilla 
with Russia and 
Turkmenistan 
3,000 
Air Force 15,000 12,000 
 
D. PARTNER TO ALL, ALLY OF NONE 
Rather than building up a massive military to secure its expansive territories and 
stave off potential aggressors, Kazakhstan has chosen to take on a multilateral, non-
threatening approach to security. Nazarbayev took the unconventional step of 
diplomatically neutralizing the Russian threat by signing an agreement to merge Russian 
and Kazakhstani military forces in 1994; however, over time, this plan has proven to be a 
mere symbolic gesture as Kazakhstan continues to work toward independence from 
Russia.136 Even though, like all Central Asian states, Kazakhstan has maintained a 
bilateral military agreement with Moscow, it has also refused to devote itself to just a 
single binding alliance.137 As a balancing mechanism, Kazakhstan has joined several 
international security organizations, including those headed by the West, Russia, China, 
and within the Central Asian region. 
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Kazakhstan’s attitude toward joining security organizations is therefore consistent 
with the logic of Nazarbayev’s multi-vector policy; that is, remaining friendly to all sides 
without being dominated by any one. After independence, Kazakhstan saw promise in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but for several reasons, the alliance fell into 
irrelevance by the mid-1990s. The CIS suffered from the lack of clearly developed goals 
and structure and Russia’s tendency to see the pact as a proxy for its influence in the 
post-Soviet space.138 Nazarbayev, despite wanting to see the CIS grow into a permanent, 
dependable security arrangement, lamented that “the desire to safeguard oneself against a 
return to the empire…outweighed all the rational agreements in favor of integration.”139 
Kazakhstan’s membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 
has likewise led to few concrete actions. Founded in May 2002, CSTO aimed to become 
NATO’s counterpart in Eurasia, but its Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF), which 
nominally includes 3,000–4,000 Kazakhstani troops, lost much of its credibility when it 
failed to intervene in response to ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan.140 Although 
Russia is the lead nation in CSTO, it is hard to see Kazakhstan willingly involve itself in 
a large-scale military operation on foreign soil. 
Meanwhile, Kazakhstan began to build other international security links, joining 
the OSCE and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.141 Participation in the 
OSCE, which is the only institution in which Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states 
“are represented on an equal basis” with Western Europe and Russia, has allowed 
Kazakhstan to bolster its sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as enhance its 
economic development through diplomatic connections.142 As early as December 1991, 
NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and all CIS countries 
became members, which allowed them an alternative avenue for security cooperation and 
closer ties with the West. Established in January 1994, PfP enabled members to take part 
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in military training and exercises, as well as sharing in peacekeeping responsibilities.143 
Kazakhstan has ostensibly taken the next step toward NATO membership by becoming 
the only Central Asian state that has volunteered to take part in the Individual Partnership 
Action Plan (IPAP). The level of commitment is admittedly low, consisting of 
designating the KAZBAT, an infantry battalion earmarked for potential deployment in 
peacekeeping operations, establishing a PfP regional training center in Kazakhstan, and 
cooperating with partner nations in military training activities.144 Since the Russian 
military considers losing influence in Central Asia as “a threat to Russian state security,” 
Kazakhstan’s participation in IPAP should be viewed as a way to gain more trust from 
western powers rather than a full abandonment of its security ties with Russia. Therefore, 
a push toward full NATO membership is unlikely.145 By utilizing its military only as 
peacekeepers through security cooperation efforts with the West, Kazakhstan can reap the 
dual benefits of gaining international trust and recognition, which would hopefully lead 
to foreign investments without infringing on Russia’s sensitivities about losing influence 
in Central Asia. At the same time, unlike other Central Asian republics that received 
funds, mainly from the United States, to host NATO military bases or supply transit 
routes after 9/11, Kazakhstan has become wealthy enough to reject such arrangements 
which might threaten relations with Russia and China.146 
Lastly, by joining China-led multilateral organizations, Kazakhstan has been able 
to gain security guarantees and attract investments from China with minimal military 
commitment. Attracted by the abundance of the region’s energy resources, starting in 
1996, China strived to conclude border demarcation talks with Central Asian republics 
through the Shanghai Five forum, which alleviated one of Nazarbayev’s great security 
concerns.147 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the successor organization, 
has within its charter the Chinese goal of combatting the “three evils”—terrorism, 
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separatism, and extremism—which is politically convenient for Kazakhstan to get on 
board. Unlike Western organizations, however, China’s leadership in SCO is based on 
the non-interference principle that imposes no requirements on member states’ domestic 
policy.148 Within this framework, Kazakhstan has been able to build ties with China that 
led to lucrative business deals without the political and military commitments that the 
West and Russia demand. 
E. CONCLUSION 
By internally balancing in a measured, non-threatening manner and demonstrating 
its willingness to be a peacekeeping partner without overcommitting its forces, 
Kazakhstan has demonstrated a nuanced way for a rising power to use its military and 
alliances to peacefully achieve its security objectives while gaining international 
influence. The zenith of this strategy’s success came in 2010, when Nazarbayev secured 
Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of the OSCE, and then again in 2016, when Kazakhstan 
became the first Central Asian state to secure a temporary seat on the United Nations 
Security Council.149 This is a remarkable ascent for a new republic whose continued 
viability was in doubt just two decades ago, and it could not have been possible without 
strong economic development that both stabilized domestic politics and funded 
international connections. The next chapter explores the economic development policies 
that Nazarbayev implemented, and how Kazakhstan’s shrewd manipulation of its 
resource blessing and geographical curse resulted in the growth of domestic wealth and 
international power. 
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IV. ECONOMY: THE GEOECONOMIC STRATEGIES 
Since its independence, Kazakhstan has defied classical realism in its pursuit of 
security, independence, and power. Although sandwiched between major powers with 
thousands of miles of borders that are difficult to defend and a relatively small population 
with which to secure its territory, Kazakhstan has intentionally eschewed bulking up its 
military. Instead, it has chosen to develop its economy and build international 
connections, especially through the use of its natural resources and geography. 
Kazakhstan is a good example of an aspiring middle power that struggles to use 
its natural resources to carve out a niche for itself. In its tight space between several 
major powers, Kazakhstan aims to gain international respect and freedom to maneuver in 
a complex and sometimes hostile neighborhood. This chapter demonstrates that 
Kazakhstan as a producer state views its natural resources as a means to power and not an 
end. Nazarbayev’s regime has shrewdly taken advantage of consumer states’ resource 
dependency and its own geopolitical positioning to build revenue streams and multilateral 
connections, with the strategic goal of gaining power and independence as part of its 
“multi-vector” foreign policy. 
A. THROUGH A DIFFERENT LOOKING-GLASS 
The field of geoeconomics provides a more comprehensive lens than geopolitics 
or economics alone for analyzing Kazakhstan’s policy choices. As discussed in the 
literature review, geoeconomics is an international relations model that is based on 
economic competition but allows for win-win outcomes, and gives states not traditionally 
considered to be major powers an avenue to rise and even prosper vis-à-vis the great 
powers without resorting to force. Kazakhstan is a prime example of this development. 
This chapter focuses on Kazakhstan’s two most significant natural resource 
industries. The Caspian region’s oil and gas industry since the end of the Soviet Union 
provides a historical view of Kazakhstan’s geoeconomic policies, and it remains the 
biggest source of revenue for the country. More recently, Kazakhstan became the world’s 
top exporter of uranium and, as the global economy shifts away from fossil fuels due to 
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concerns about climate change, this industry has the potential to rise to an even higher 
level of importance. A comparison of these industries reveals Kazakhstan’s largely 
consistent approach to converting natural resources to international power, employing the 
following geoeconomic strategies to varying degrees: 
1. Using business deals to strengthen the regime 
2. Exploiting geographical positioning between major powers 
3. Leveraging consumer states’ dependence on foreign mineral resources 
4. Using resource rents to strengthen the domestic economy 
Strengthening the regime with business deals is the most consistently employed 
strategy between the two different resource types. Nazarbayev’s regime uses commercial 
deals to bring in revenue, but, more importantly, these are tools for forging diplomatic 
relationships, which elevate the regime’s international prestige. The next three strategies 
all feature more heavily in the oil and gas realm, but less so for uranium. Leveraging 
geography and consumer states’ need for fossil fuel are both useful instruments that has 
allowed Kazakhstan to play off major powers off one another, freeing Nazarbayev to 
pursue his policy goals with less concern over external interference. The new multipolar 
structure of the international order, specifically with Russia’s decline, China’s rise, and 
the United States shifting its attention away from the post-Soviet space, leave more 
partnership options for smaller countries and enable Nazarbayev to successfully 
implement these strategies. Lastly, despite the authoritarian nature of his rule, 
Nazarbayev has not neglected to develop the domestic economy and improve the lives of 
ordinary citizens, partly because he realizes the importance of a supportive population to 
the stability of the regime, but also partly due to a genuine desire to elevate Kazakhstan’s 
status. These geoeconomic strategies have produced the hallmark win-win outcomes for 
both Kazakhstan and its international partners, facilitating the republic’s peaceful rise in 
the modern world. 
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B. OIL 
1. A History of Neglect and Dependency 
For centuries, locals and travelers in the Caspian Sea region have been aware of 
the presence of oil. As early as the thirteenth century, Marco Polo reported the presence 
of oil springs during his travels through the Silk Road.150 The oil industry in present-day 
Kazakhstan dates back to the nineteenth century in the northern Caspian region, when the 
Russian Empire allowed private foreign interests to lease out oil fields for production, 
leading to an “eastern extension of the great Azeri boom” that established names such as 
Nobel and Rothschild as synonyms for unparalleled wealth.151 The relationship between 
local Kazakhs and the industry turned hostile at times, since the oil companies’ miners 
began to use water from the wells on which the former depended for their herds.152 
After the Revolution in 1917, the Bolsheviks seized privately held oil fields, and 
although for a time Lenin allowed Western investments under his “New Economic 
Policy,” Stalin’s power consolidation after Lenin’s death brought an end to large-scale 
foreign involvement in the Soviet oil industry.153 The German threat to the Caspian oil 
fields during World War Two pushed Soviet oil production into the Volga-Urals 
heartland, but the Caspian fields remained crucial to the Soviet energy portfolio.154 Since 
the time of the Russian Empire, Azerbaijan’s output, concentrated around Baku, dwarfed 
that of present-day Kazakhstan; however, the tables started to turn in the 1970s as the 
Baku fields saw a sharp decline in production, while Kazakhstani fields became more 
productive (Table 2). Nevertheless, Kazakhstan’s oil industry continued to suffer from 
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Moscow’s neglect despite its large untapped potential, even though oil was cheaper to 
extract on the eastern side of the Caspian.155 
Table 2.   The increasing production of Kazakhstani oil in the Soviet Union, 
compared with Azerbaijan156 
Post-revolution Caucaso–Caspian Oil Output 
(million tons per year) 
 Azerbaijan Kazakhstan USSR Total 
1930 10.6 0.35 18.45 
1937 21.4 0.5 28.5 
1945 11.55 0.8 19.45 
1955 15.3 1.4 70.8 
1965 21.5 2.0 242.9 
1975 17.1 - - 
1989 13.8 22 - 
1991 < 10 - - 
 
Furthermore, Moscow mandated that the periphery ship its raw materials to 
Russia for processing.157 In the case of Kazakhstani oil, this meant that there was only 
one unidirectional pipeline that transported crude from the Kazakhstani city of Atyrau 
(formerly Guriev) on the productive northeastern Caspian shore to the Russian city of 
Samara for refining before reaching the European market.158 A separate north-south 
pipeline lay in the eastern part of the republic and exclusively imported Russian oil from 
Siberia to the refineries in the northeastern Kazakhstani city of Pavlodar and to Shymkent 
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in the south.159 Such an arrangement of infrastructure precluded Kazakhstan from fully 
integrating its own oil industry and reinforced its economic dependence on Moscow. 
In hindsight, Nazarbayev’s multi-vector policy may have taken root in the soil of 
the declining Soviet oil industry, which eventually allowed the entry of international 
players, especially American companies led by Chevron. Beginning in the 1960s, the 
industry stagnated with the rest of the Soviet economy, from lack of investment and 
technological innovation. By the 1980s, Gorbachev faced difficult Soviet economic 
realities but was pragmatic enough to attempt a revitalization of the industry by bringing 
in foreign investors. This rebellion against long-standing Soviet ideological and legal 
norms—after all, communism vilified the profit motive, and Soviet law prohibited 
Western firms from owning Soviet enterprises—set the stage for the multilateral strategy 
that Kazakhstan would employ during the post-Soviet years.160  
The western investment that Gorbachev desperately needed to develop the oil 
fields trickled in slowly until he met James Giffen, the American president of the U.S.–
USSR trade council, who would remain influential well into Nazarbayev’s rule. Giffen 
was in charge of recruiting American companies to invest in Soviet enterprises. In May 
1985, he managed to first rope in Chevron, which was looking for overseas opportunities 
after losing its stakes in Saudi Arabia in the late 1970s, and then used the 
accomplishment to bring in more big-name investors. Just three months later, this group 
of investors received Gorbachev’s blessing and formed the American Trade 
Consortium.161 
Thus, Western interests began their return into the Eurasian energy industry as 
part of a precursor to the Washington Consensus-style market liberalization and 
privatization of state enterprises that would transform, for better or worse, former Soviet 
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economies in the 1990s.162 Thereafter, a series of foreign companies, governments, and 
individuals would appear on the scene, and their eagerness for oil and profit would enable 
Kazakhstan’s elites to play them off each other while extracting more favorable 
contractual terms and other benefits.163 
2. The Oil Fields 
Kazakhstan’s three largest oil fields all lie on the western Caspian region of the 
country, with Tengiz located on the northeast shore of the inland sea, Kashagan just 
offshore in the same area, and Karachaganak further north, on the Russian border (see 
Figure 2). This thesis primarily focuses on the Tengiz field, as the history surrounding its 
development is most relevant and illustrative of Nazarbayev’s policymaking. 
Karachaganak is the oldest of the three major fields and was the only one put into 
production during the Soviet period. As a sign of the Soviet industry’s dysfunction, the 
field was explored in the early 1960s but did not begin production until 1986.164 Later 
on, for various reasons, the development of Tengiz and Kashagan also experienced 
significant delays. 
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Figure 2.  Kazakhstan’s major oil fields165 
The Kazakh people, ever mindful of their history of oppression and the 
destruction of their environment under Moscow’s control, firmly believe that the oil 
fields belong to them. The presence of these large oil fields on Kazakh land was also a 
point of pride, for it gained the republic a small measure of respect in Moscow when 
Russians generally regarded the republic with disdain.166 These sentiments would prove 
politically useful to Nazarbayev during the tenuous period of the mid-1990s, as he battled 
Yeltsin to secure Tengiz for Kazakhstan and gain legitimacy for himself as its new ruler. 
The Soviets also showed themselves to be ill-prepared to operate these large 
gusher fields. In 1985, an explosion at Well 37 of the recently opened Tengiz released a 
700-foot tall column of flames into the sky, which was observed by U.S. spy satellites. 
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The USSR Ministry of Oil did not possess the equipment or knowledge to contain the 
disaster and, eventually, had to resort to requesting the assistance of American and 
Canadian experts. The secret was out; Kazakhstan was the site of some world-class 
oil reserves.167 
A Chevron engineer once remarked that Tengiz, discovered in 1979, was “a 
perfect oil field” and, judging from the numbers, the field’s initially estimated 10 billion 
barrels of recoverable reserves—among the top ten in the world—seemed to bear out that 
title.168 After Gorbachev’s approval of the American Trade Consortium, Chevron set its 
sight on Tengiz as its preferred field; however, upon inspection, several undesirable 
qualities make the field less attractive. The field’s associated “sour gas” is laden with 
heavy concentrations of toxic and caustic hydrogen sulfide, the condition of the field was 
poor at the time from decades of neglect, and the location is remote and lacking 
transportation infrastructure. It soon became clear that Tengiz would be financially and 
technologically costly and dangerous to develop, but a determined Chevron eagerly 
signed a pact with the Soviets in June 1990, giving the company exclusive rights of 
negotiation on this field.169 The collapse of the Soviet Empire unexpectedly voided 
Chevron’s deal, and both technical and political difficulties would delay Tengiz’s 
full production.  
3. Implementing the “Multi-vector” Policy  
In the early years of independence, Nazarbayev wrestled with a complicated web 
of issues. Faced with dilapidated infrastructure, technical brain drain, and a crumbling 
economy, the new Kazakh leader realized that Kazakhstan could not take advantage of its 
wealth of natural resources without outside help. Thus, he decided to stay the course of 
opening up to the West as previously undertaken by Gorbachev. There is certainly an 
argument to be made that Nazarbayev arrived at this policy due to a simple lack of 
options, but such determinism ignores the case of neighboring Turkmenistan, whose path 
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of state and resource development diverged from Kazakhstan’s multilateral engagement 
toward isolationist neutrality.170 Although a full review is outside the scope of this thesis, 
Turkmenistan is an interesting case of another newly independent and resource-rich 
Central Asian republic that made a different choice: to wall itself off from Western 
influences and, indeed, most of the outside world. On the other hand, Nazarbayev’s 
ambitions lay in achieving international prominence, so he welcomed any foreign 
corporations and investors who had the expertise and capital to help him use 
Kazakhstan’s abundant but untapped black gold to build his new nation. The resulting 
lucrative success of this approach is evident in Kazakhstan’s oil production numbers 
(Table 3), which were already the highest in the Caspian region near the end of the Soviet 
era but skyrocketed in the new millennium. Striking a new deal with Chevron would be 
the biggest of Nazarbayev’s early victories.  
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Strategy 1: Using business deals to strengthen the regime 
Kazakhstan’s joint ventures in oil production and pipeline construction with 
foreign commercial actors have served both economic and diplomatic purposes for 
Kazakhstan. Besides generating rent payments and export revenue that enrich the regime, 
opening up Kazakhstan for business deals also helped to build diplomatic connections 
with western governments that strengthened Kazakhstan’s position in the international 
community. Although he was the last leader of a Soviet republic to declare independence 
from the USSR, on December 16, 1991, Nazarbayev immediately began to move 
decisively toward greater autonomy from Russia. Expanding Kazakhstan’s diplomatic 
horizons toward the West was crucial in balancing against Russia’s influence.172 Early 
on, Nazarbayev demonstrated a willingness to work with whomever could help advance 
Kazakhstan’s interests, and he proved to be a tough negotiator who could secure 
favorable terms from governments and companies alike.  
After the original Soviet agreement with Chevron was voided by the USSR’s 
collapse, Kazakhstan was now responsible for reaching its own deal with foreign firms to 
develop Tengiz, and Nazarbayev’s regime displayed its capability early on in extracting 
lucrative benefits from foreign players on its turf. To facilitate the new negotiations, 
Nazarbayev retained the services of the controversial Giffen, who negotiated deals with 
oil companies on the Kazakhstani government’s behalf while earning for his Mercator 
consulting firm 7.5 cents for every barrel that came out of Tengiz.173 In 1993, Chevron 
signed what Nazarbayev and several Russian and U.S. news agencies called “the contract 
of the century,” forming the giant joint company Tengizchevoil to extract oil from the 
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enormous field.174 The moniker applied mostly from Kazakhstan’s perspective; the joint 
venture was 50-50 in terms of ownership, but the equality ended there. The Kazakhstani 
government would receive 80% of the revenues, and Chevron would fund most of the 
$20 billion investment required to develop the field until it generated positive cash flow; 
only then would the government’s contribution begin.175 
The Chevron deal was not just an economic triumph, but also played a role in 
building diplomatic ties and gaining international recognition for Nazarbayev during the 
nuclear disarmament negotiations. Beginning in December 1991, the Clinton 
Administration began making earnest overtures to convince Kazakhstan to give up its 
stock of nuclear weapons. Unsure of future relations with Russia and facing a crumbling 
economy, Nazarbayev was most concerned with obtaining security guarantees and 
economic assistance in exchange for Kazakhstan’s signature to the Lisbon Protocol of the 
START treaty.176 In May 1992, during his first visit to the United States at the invitation 
of President George H. W. Bush, the cooperation deal with Chevron featured prominently 
in the negotiations, with the U.S. side using it as a carrot for disarmament while 
Kazakhstan used it to demonstrate the republic’s willingness to be a partner to the West 
in both commerce and peace.177 
In return for giving up nuclear weapons and reaching an agreement with a 
Western oil company on development of Tengiz field, Nazarbayev won the Western 
recognition and economic assistance that he craved, on top of foreign injection of capital, 
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technology, and expertise into Kazakhstan’s oil industry. Meanwhile, Chevron was 
saddled with the financial burden and technical challenges of developing Tengiz for years 
before oil began to profitably flow from the field.178 Profiting from the field, however, 
involved overcoming of another challenge: getting the oil to market from Kazakhstan’s 
remote location, without exclusively transiting through Russian territory. 
Strategy 2: Exploiting geographical positioning between major powers 
As Chapter Two points out, historically, Kazakhstan’s geography has been a 
threat to its security and a detriment to its development. However, Nazarbayev figured 
out how to turn this curse into a blessing. The timing of this strategy was fortuitous after 
the Cold War, with Russia struggling to maintain its influence in Central Asia, the West 
concerned with nuclear nonproliferation and other regional security issues, and China’s 
rapidly growing appetite for resources. In the world of oil and gas, Nazarbayev’s multi-
vector policy has no clearer illustration than the development of pipelines over the last 
two and a half decades, which has shifted much of Kazakhstan’s fossil fuel production 
toward China and away from its tradition transit routes through Russia, thus transforming 
the geoeconomic balance in Central Asia. 
At the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse, all of the major pipelines from Central 
Asia traveled north into Russia, which had a “disproportionate control over the price and 
amount of oil shipped.”179 In the early 1990s, building pipelines was less visionary for 
Kazakhstan than necessary for its survival. Kazakhstan was battling a freefalling 
economy, with GDP falling by as much as 40% since 1990, and Tengiz oil was a vital 
part of correcting that trend. Yet, even after Tengiz opened for production, the problem of 
how to export to the world market remained. Initially, the only options were expensive 
and inefficient: load the oil into tankers bound for Baku and then Azeri and Georgian rail 
cars, or lease trains that went through Russia to Ukraine. Although building a pipeline 
was a reasonable solution, Chevron considered that option to be Kazakhstan’s 
responsibility, since pipeline infrastructure is a national asset that would cross Russian 
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territory, where foreign ownership was frowned upon. For its part, the young state lacked 
the capability for such a large undertaking and turned to another controversial figure to 
come up with a solution. John Deuss, a Dutchman who had previously earned 
Kazakhstani government’s trust by arranging an Omani line of credit to keep the newly 
independent republic solvent, received Oman’s financial backing to establish the Caspian 
Pipeline Consortium (CPC). As CPC’s principal sponsor, Deuss feuded openly with 
Chevron, which soon realized that it would be missing out on the profits from high 
pipeline tariffs. Nazarbayev publicly aired his frustration at the Deuss-Chevron impasse, 
since his main concern was not who was building the pipeline, but that Tengiz’s oil 
reached the market.180 He also understood that, beyond its economic impact, the humble 
pipeline would take on geopolitical dimensions. 
Suspicious of growing western influence in its Near Abroad, Russia viewed 
American companies’ activities in the Caspian region with resentment. Besides, the 
Chevron-Soviet pact was still part of recent history and, in President Yeltsin’s eyes, 
Tengiz belonged to Russia. However, such delusions held no sway in the 1990s, in view 
of Russia’s chaotic internal weakness and Kazakhstan’s desire to break free from the 
Russian yoke.181 In the end, Nazarbayev realized that he could leverage the United 
States’ regional interests to build a solution in Kazakhstan’s favor. The world’s 
remaining superpower wished to support Kazakhstan’s pursuit of nationhood and 
independence from Russia and gain its cooperation on the nuclear weapons disposal 
issue. The result was that Russian and American companies’ joined forces to purchase 
shares in the Tengiz field and strike a 50-50 state-private partnership to build the 
pipeline. The private companies would pay $2.6 billion for construction, Russia and 
Kazakhstan would negotiate the right of way with local communities within their borders 
along the pipeline’s entire 940-mile length, and the governments of Russia, Kazakhstan, 
and Oman would all share in the spoils.182 The first oil began to flow through the CPC 
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pipeline in 2001, and by 2011, 630,000 barrels a day flowed out of Tengiz. The pipeline 
also carries oil from Karachaganak and other smaller fields to international markets.183 
Despite technical difficulties with sour gas that drove up Tengiz development cost 
from $20 billion to $30 billion, the CPC proved a lucrative and liberating success for 
Kazakhstan in two ways.184 First, the involvement of U.S. political figures and Omani 
investors in the post-Soviet space, especially on Russian territory, served as an example 
of Russia’s weakness during the Yeltsin years, while Kazakhstan continued to build more 
commercial and diplomatic ties outside of Russia’s sphere of influence. Second, 
Nazarbayev managed the delicate balance between achieving more economic 
independence from and maintaining friendly relations with Moscow. The CPC served 
both purposes by connecting Kazakhstani oil to the world market but also allowing 
Russia to profit through transit fees, thus softening the blow of Kazakhstan’s diplomatic 
forays abroad and lessening the chance that Russia would retaliate. 
The rise of China in the East presented another valuable geoeconomic opportunity 
for Kazakhstan to extricate itself from Russia’s orbit. Kazakhstan’s relationship with 
China over oil and pipelines is another illustration of the former’s balancing strategy with 
respect to its resources. In 1997, the world took little notice of the first deal that the state-
owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) inked with Kazakhstan, but it was 
a significant step toward a growing partnership in the future. CNPC’s purchase of the 
firm Aktobe Munaigas came with the commitment to construct a pipeline that would 
transport the extracted oil eastward, away from the traditional route of going through 
Russia to the European market.185  
China’s own geographical challenges worked in Kazakhstan’s favor. China has 
relied on transporting oil by sea from Europe and the Middle East through the Strait of 
Malacca, a crowded and narrow sea lane that connects the Indian Ocean with the South 
China Sea, passing between Malaysia, Singapore, and western Indonesia. The former 
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Chinese President Hu Jintao coined the term “Malacca Dilemma” to highlight the 
difficulty of the burgeoning Chinese economy’s overreliance on Middle Eastern oil 
moving through this bottleneck.186 The Caspian energy resources presented a sensible 
overland solution to this conundrum, and China was eager to pay a steep price to obtain 
access. With the opening of the 625-mile Atasu-Alashankou pipeline to China’s western 
frontier in December 2005, Kazakhstan has secured a durable export market and strategic 
partnership with China.187 The Trans-Asia Gas Pipeline that moves Turkmenistan’s gas 
export into western China also crosses a vast area in southern Kazakhstan, bringing in tax 
revenue and the ability to export Kazakhstani gas to China in the future.188 Thus, the 
cooperation between Kazakhstan and China has become very mutually beneficial; China 
diversified its energy import sources, and Kazakhstan gained an expansive, previously 
untapped export market, further allowing it to break free from its economic dependence 
on Russia. 
Strategy 3: Leveraging consumer states’ need for resources 
Realist logic would dictate that, since Kazakhstan is a weaker state relative to its 
powerful neighbors, it would become the target of geopolitical and economic 
exploitation; however, that has not been the case. Even as part of his scathing critique of 
Central Asian regimes, Alexander Cooley gives credit to their “considerable agency” in 
drawing up “local rules,” through which they leverage the interests of geopolitical suitors 
and incite competition to secure domestic political power and gain economic benefits.189 
For example, China’s reliance on Central Asian mineral resources has greatly 
strengthened Nazarbayev’s regime through Beijing’s overpriced investments and a policy 
of political non-interference. Kazakhstan has also employed a divide-and-conquer 
strategy with other resource consumers, reaching favorable bilateral deals separately with 
multiple customers, thus preventing them from concentrating their negotiating power. 
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At first, China’s engagement with post-Soviet Central Asia stemmed from a 
security concern for the stability of its restive Xinjiang region. To that end, China 
spearheaded the Shanghai Five forum, which evolved into the current SCO in 2001, 
composing of China, Russia, and all the Central Asian republics except the reclusive 
Turkmenistan. This organization’s stated goal is combating “terrorism, separatism, and 
extremism.”190 However, over time, China’s regional emphasis has shifted toward 
finding secure foreign sources of energy to satisfy its burgeoning domestic demand. 
China became a net importer of oil in 1993, when its economy was growing at 10 percent 
annually.191 By November 2010, The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated that 
China’s oil demand had reached more than 10 million barrels a day, 4.8 million of which 
was imported.192 Such a high reliance on foreign mineral resources forces China to invest 
heavily abroad and maintain friendly relations with producer regimes to sustain national 
energy security.193 
Since the early days of independence, during which state survival was a main 
driver of oil politics, Kazakhstan’s use of this instrument of power and independence has 
become more assertive. As its economy stabilized and began rapidly growing in the new 
millennium, Kazakhstan became more willing to leverage consumer states’ dependence 
on its oil to extract beneficial terms, including “playing rough with both Western and 
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Chinese companies.”194 It is interesting to note that, other than the obvious goal of 
attracting foreign investment, Kazakhstan applies this leverage slightly differently, 
depending on the various objectives of foreign firms. From more experienced Western 
private firms that are primarily profit-driven, Kazakhstan brings in their expertise and 
technology to develop large yet difficult projects, such as Tengiz and the off-shore 
Kashagan. On the other hand, hungry Asian economies, such as China and India, are 
willing to take on worse contract terms to access the many smaller and less profitable oil 
fields.195 Both types of customers are getting what they want while paying a premium. 
Through this compartmentalizing of the customer base, Kazakhstan has “increased state 
control of its resources while maintaining relatively high levels of foreign investment.”196 
Strategy 4: Using resource rents to strengthen the economy 
As the outflowing oil and high energy prices brought in rapidly rising revenue in 
the late 1990s and into the 2000s, the Kazakhstani government’s spending plan focused 
on economic development as a primary means of keeping the regime in power and 
increasing its status, rather than as a mere stepping stone to military might, as traditional 
realists would suggest. This strategy goes beyond simply enriching the regime itself, 
which the Kazakhstani elite has certainly also done. A vibrant economy for the country as 
a whole is important for the image-conscious Nazarbayev for several reasons. On a 
personal and philosophical level, Nazarbayev is keen to validate to the international 
community his way of strengthening Kazakhstan’s statehood with “strong presidential 
power plus rapid, energetic economic reform.”197 If he can accomplish the latter, then 
liberal Western leaders and institutions who are skeptical of his autocracy would have 
less ammunition with which to criticize and interfere. To this end, domestically 
distributing economic wealth and opportunities enables the growth of a middle class, 
which fosters an optimistic population that is supportive of the regime. In turn, domestic 
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legitimacy and economic achievements empower Nazarbayev to build personal and 
national prestige abroad, allowing him to pursue foreign policy objectives more freely.  
As long as Nazarbayev can keep Kazakhstan’s economic engine going, he can 
continue to outwardly project himself as a respectable leader who has successfully 
integrated the most useful elements of the market-centric and state-centric economic 
models. These elements are both visible within the two main mechanisms into which 
Nazarbayev has channeled Kazakhstan’s resource revenue: establishing robust sovereign 
wealth funds and developing human capital, especially by raising living standards and 
funding education. It is notable that, despite the endemic corruption throughout Central 
Asia, Kazakhstan has been relatively successful so far in escaping the resource curse 
through deliberate policy efforts that apply resource rents to stabilize and grow the 
economy. 
(1) Sovereign Wealth Funds 
In contrast to its financial troubles in the 1990s, Kazakhstan’s economic 
performance since then has been spectacular, especially when compared to the other 
Central Asian republics. Kazakhstan’s GDP remained at around $20 billion per year 
throughout the 1990s but took off in the new millennium, peaking at $236.6 billion in 
2013 before settling back down, due to falling oil prices, at $184.4 billion in 2015: still a 
remarkable 8,220 percent increase from the immediate post-Soviet period.198 Kazakhstan 
has also been relatively successful in diversifying its economy away from oil and gas 
revenue. The portion of GDP earned from natural resource rents has dropped from a 2005 
peak of 27.7 percent (21 percent from oil) to just 9.2 percent (5.6 percent from oil) in 
2015.199 As of 2016, 57.9 percent of Kazakhstan’s GDP comes from the service sector, 
compared with 31.8 percent from the industrial sector, of which mineral resource 
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production is the main component.200 Such growth and diversification require a 
mechanism to “convert natural resource wealth into more ‘spendable’ financial assets” 
that can be invested elsewhere; therefore, Nazarbayev established by presidential decree 
several SWFs.201 Despite valid concerns over lack of transparency, the management and 
use of the two most significant funds—Samruk-Kazyna and the National Fund for the 
Future of Kazakhstan (or NOF, the “national oil fund”)—have by and large demonstrated 
the regime’s seriousness in committing a large portion of the resource revenue to 
economic stability and development. 
Samruk-Kazyna, the largest SWF in Kazakhstan, came into being in late 2008, 
following the SWF models of Malaysia and Singapore. The massive development fund is 
effectively a government holding company, with $66.7 billion in assets, employing 
360,000 workers, and constituting a quarter of all investments in the country.202 At its 
height in 2012, the fund’s assets were estimated to be worth 50 to 80 percent of GDP, 
while generating a revenue stream worth at least 20 to 30 percent of GDP. The fund’s 
diverse portfolio stretches across many industries, including five state monopolies—
KazTelecom, KazRail, Kazmunaigas, KazPost, and KazGok—as well as the national 
airline Air Astana, real estate ventures, and commercial banks.203 This high level of state 
control and associated lack of transparency readily invite critics, who accuse the funds of 
stifling private competition, serving the regime’s policy objectives, and enabling the 
state’s hoarding of resources, but that is exactly the point. These fair critiques in fact 
illustrate how tightly sovereign wealth funds are tied into the state’s power apparatus, 
with the potential to benefit the ruling regime at the expense of the public. Yet, so far, 
Kazakhstan’s SWFs have not been detrimental to its economy; in fact, quite the opposite.  
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Although some critics have charged that Samruk-Kazyna has become too 
unwieldy to be efficient and transparent, supporters have touted the fund’s crucial 
stabilizing role, especially during the 2008 financial crisis, from which Kazakhstan 
emerged relatively unscathed.204 For example, in October of that year, the government 
was able to temporarily nationalize the largest vulnerable banks that it deemed too big to 
fail, and part of the rescue scheme involved purchasing controlling shares in BTA Bank 
(78.14 percent) and Alliance Bank (76 percent) with funds from Samruk-Kazyna. The 
$1.7 billion that the government injected into BTA Bank and $200 million into Alliance 
Bank allowed these banks to repay foreign debts and remain solvent, with the additional 
benefit of signaling the state’s commitment to protecting the public’s deposits.205 
Whereas Samruk-Kazyna is designed to mainly fund growth and development 
projects as the government sees fit, the NOF serves primarily as a stabilization and 
savings fund. Established in 2000, the NOF exists within the National Bank of 
Kazakhstan, and is owned by the Ministry of Finance and managed by the national 
bank’s Treasury Department. The fund grew from $8 billion in 2005 to $41.6 billion in 
2010, with two-thirds of its revenue generated via taxes on oil production sharing and 
royalties and another 20 percent coming from oil and gas lease payments. Other sources 
of income are investments and sales from land privatization. The fund’s mandate allows 
for targeted direct transfers into Samruk-Kazyna, such as occurred in response to the 
2008 financial crisis. However, the more conventional use of the NOF’s assets is to 
provide for the economic wellbeing of future generations through investment in various 
stability and savings funds denominated in both U.S. dollars and the Kazakhstani 
tenge.206 
Samruk-Kazyna and the NOF complement each other in their roles of ensuring 
stability in the short term and enabling development in the long term. Before the steep 
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downturn of the global oil market in 2014, observers noted that the NOF was “relatively 
well managed [and] transparent” and the government was taking serious steps to improve 
Samruk-Kazyna’s transparency and corporate governance practices.207 These SWFs have 
played an important role in strengthening the population’s faith in the financial system 
and hope in the country’s economic future overall, but serious challenges remain, in the 
face of continually depressed oil prices, with some experts predicting that the NOF will 
be depleted by 2026.208 Continued diversification away from oil and gas will be crucial 
for sustaining these SWFs in the future.  
(2) Human Capital: Living Standards 
One of the symptoms of the resource curse is that regimes who do not rely on tax 
revenue but benefit from the direct sale of mineral resources lack the political incentives 
to develop the economy for the population’s benefit.209 However, the importance that 
Nazarbayev has placed on domestic legitimacy and international approval has become an 
alternative impetus for investing resource rents in genuine economic and human capital 
development. On this front, Kazakhstan still has to overcome some structural challenges, 
but has achieved a great deal of success. 
Although for most Kazakhstanis, the Western quality of life is still far out of 
reach, their living standards have improved dramatically since independence. In terms of 
purchasing power parity (PPP) in international dollars, Kazakhstan’s GDP per capita has 
more than quadrupled from a nadir of $6,039 in 1995 to $25,264 in 2016, surpassing 
Russia and far above all other Central Asian states.210 Life expectancy has risen from a 
low of 64 in 1996 to 72 years old by 2015, and infant mortality has fallen from 44.5 per 
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1,000 live births in 1991 to 12.6 in 2015.211 The poverty rate—defined as $1.90 per day 
in 2011 PPP dollars—has fallen from 10.5 percent in 2001 to almost zero, and 
unemployment fell to 5.2 percent in 2015 from a high of 13.5 percent in 1999.212 The 
government has also made strides in providing assistance to small enterprises, privatizing 
land ownership, and paying out higher government salaries. The private economy has 
surpassed the state in accounting for most of the workforce and economy. After studying 
and training in Europe, young Kazakhs believe that they can build a western lifestyle 
back home; as one noted, “We aren’t smuggling capital overseas, instead we’re taking 
out mortgages [at home].”213 
(3) Human Capital: Education 
As part of his vision to position Kazakhstan as an internationally connected state, 
in 1993 Nazarbayev initiated the Bolashak study abroad program as an instrument to 
nurture the next generation of Kazakhstani leaders and experts. With funds from resource 
exports, the government can afford to build the administrative bureaucracy that manages 
and pays for university and graduate degree programs in more than 30 countries, mostly 
in the United States and Europe. Participating students agree to return to Kazakhstan to 
work for a minimum of five years. The program has grown from 60 to 80 students per 
year in the 1990s to several hundred, with the eventual goal of having 3,000 abroad at 
any given time, which equates to awarding 500 scholarships per year out of thousands of 
applicants. By 2010, the state had granted scholarships to a total of 6,697 students, 
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bringing back a wealth of international knowledge and experience and applying them in 
corporate and government positions.214 
The government’s evolving management of the Bolashak program has also 
displayed a responsiveness to public opinion and economic needs not usually associated 
with authoritarian regimes. After a 1997 scandal exposed that government elites’ children 
were receiving priority consideration for the scholarships, the government quickly 
implemented administrative reforms, which led to more merit-based selection and 
expanded opportunities. During the 2006 presidential elections, even with the results a 
foregone conclusion, the regime responded to public pressure for more educational 
support by increasing the number of eligible countries and schools included in the 
program. More recently, the government has implemented a quota system to attract more 
rural students into the program, with the stipulation that they return to their home regions 
to contribute to their economies and societies upon completion of the program. Lastly, 
throughout the program’s evolution, the government has had to contend with the 
challenge of developing the right type of human capital for the country’s changing 
economy. By opening up more program opportunities in technical fields—such as 
engineering, biotechnology, information technology, and oil—while closing off options 
in bloated career fields, such as finance and accounting, the Bolashak administrators are 
constantly tailoring the program to respond to the needs of the labor market and 
deficiencies in the national education system.215 
On the other hand, the government has not been as proactive in funding the public 
educational system overall. Of all of the post-Soviet region, Kazakhstan ranks among the 
lowest in public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP (3% in 2006).216 
However, like other former Soviet republics in Central Asia, Kazakhstan had the benefit 
of inheriting a literate population that values education, and, despite the lower percentage 
of government spending, Kazakhstani students have fared better on standardized math 
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tests than even some Eastern European countries.217 Nevertheless, while the government 
has opened up the market for private institutions, most students still attend state-run 
schools, so public funding remains a crucial ingredient in educating future generations.218 
The government has shown increasing initiative in addressing the educational 
funding issue, even applying the multi-vector principle in this area. From 2004 to 2008, 
the government increased education spending threefold, to 18.9 percent of the total state 
budget (compared with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) average of 12 percent), focusing on raising teachers’ salaries and upgrading 
educational buildings and infrastructure, including connecting all schools to the 
internet.219 Nazarbayev is championing language programs, including ones with the goal 
of transforming the population into a trilingual society (Kazakh, Russian, English), and 
the expensive and overtly nationalistic project of returning the Kazakh writing system 
back to the Latin alphabet, a clear move to distance Kazakhstani culture away from its 
history of domination under Russia.220 Finally, looking beyond oil and gas to industries 
that will drive Kazakhstan’s economic development in the future, the government has 
invested resource rents to address the shortfall in domestic high-tech expertise. Officials 
followed the higher education models of Singapore and Qatar, after visiting these 
countries in 2008, and the government expended $100 million to open the Nazarbayev 
University in Astana, hoping to attract foreign experts to instruct Kazakhstan’s best and 
brightest in fields such as bio- and nanotechnology. Each department at the university 
will be paired with an affiliated foreign institution to help with academic development, 
and the goal is to have foreigners make up half of the faculty.221 These projects may still 
be years away from bearing fruit, but the government recognizes the importance of 
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funding education for the sake of the country’s future development, even if it is a part of 
the regime’s empowerment strategy. 
C. URANIUM 
1. Background 
a. A Global Energy Source 
The discussions surrounding energy politics usually revolve around oil and gas, 
but as the world becomes more concerned with the potentially catastrophic effects of 
greenhouse gas-induced climate change, alternative and low-carbon sources of energy are 
becoming increasingly important parts of the conversation. According to the IEA, nuclear 
power has “historically been one of the largest contributors of carbon-free electricity 
globally,” with output increasing dramatically since the beginning of the 1970s to nearly 
2,500 terrawatt-hours across the world today (Figure 3).222 In 2014, nuclear energy 
comprised 4.8 percent of the world’s total primary energy supply; in 2015, the number 
was 9.8 percent for OECD countries.223 
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Figure 3.  The growth of global nuclear electricity production224 
In the 1990s, a series of takeovers, mergers, and closures consolidated the 
uranium production industry worldwide. As a result, most uranium mining companies in 
the world currently are state-owned, with the side-effect that sometimes purely market-
driven decisions take a backseat to policy considerations, such as ensuring supply 
security and preventing nuclear material proliferation. These industry characteristics have 
led to a highly concentrated group of large producers that can operate legally and 
profitably. In 2015, 89 percent of the world’s marketed uranium mine production came 
from only eleven companies, with 65 percent coming from the top four: Kazakhstan’s 
KazAtomProm (21%), Canada’s Cameco (17%), France’s Areva (14%), and ARMZ-
Uranium One, owned by Russia’s RosAtom (13%).225 
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Certainly, nuclear power is also a politically unpredictable energy source, with 
public concerns over its safety record heavily affecting its use. After the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear accident on 11 March, 2011, countries such as Germany and Japan 
declared plans to abandon nuclear power within the coming decades.226 Nevertheless, 
after a brief dip immediately after the accident, growing world demand for low-carbon 
energy has led to an increase in nuclear power production (Figure 3). 
b. Kazakhstan’s Uranium Industry 
Uranium extraction began in Kazakhstan in the 1950s.227 The republic inherited 
from the Soviet Union a relatively advanced nuclear mining and enrichment industry, 
including the ability to process raw uranium ore into yellowcake—a concentrated, 
powderized mixture of various uranium oxides (the most common being U3O8)—or 
uranium pellets.228 Kazakhstan has been the world’s leading producer of uranium since 
2009, when it produced nearly 28% of the world’s total; by 2016, Kazakhstan’s share of 
global production rose to 39 percent.229 The rapid increase of Kazakhstani uranium has 
been a welcomed relief for consumers. In 2007, global uranium production only satisfied 
64 percent of world demand, but, in 2016, production fulfilled 98 percent of all demand 
(Figure 4).230  
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Figure 4.  Kazakhstani (blue) uranium’s increasing role in satisfying 
world demand231 
This thesis examines whether Kazakhstan applies the same geoeconomic 
strategies with uranium as with the oil industry. Although Kazakhstan’s approaches to 
managing the two mineral resources are similar, in that they remain faithful to 
Nazarbayev’s multi-vectorism, since the resources and their markets have fundamentally 
different characteristics, there is some divergence in the policy implications. The most 
obvious and important difference is in the scale of revenue that the two resources 
generate. In 2015, KazAtomProm, Kazakhstan’s state-owned monopoly, reported a year-
end sales income of around $1.2 billion (half a percent of the $184.4 billion GDP). In 
contrast, $10.4 billion (5.6 percent of GDP) came from oil rents.232 Thus, as a source of 
revenue, uranium has never been as crucial to Kazakhstan’s economy as fossil fuels, 
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especially during the financially precarious post-independence years. Consequently, 
however, uranium is still a politically significant resource for other reasons.  
The international community’s conflated fear of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
power guarantees that this energy source will remain controversial and, for some 
producers, a potential liability. Ironically, nuclear energy’s inherent political volatility 
also allows producer states with the reputation of political pacifism and commercial 
reliability to distinguish themselves, since uranium importers and proponents of nuclear 
safety are eager to seek out trustworthy partners within a narrow field. This is the space 
in which Nazarbayev’s regime has excelled. More than just commercial ties and revenue, 
the Nazarbayev regime has generated international goodwill by demonstrating 
Kazakhstan’s dual role as a reliable business partner and a champion of nuclear safety 
and disarmament, enhancing both the regime’s and the country’s international standing in 
the process. 
2. Applying Multi-vectorism to Uranium 
Strategy 1: Using business deals to strengthen the regime 
Kazakhstan’s multi-vectored approach to policy-making extends to its uranium 
production and export industry. Nazarbayev has trumpeted his regime’s investment-
friendliness to attract foreign capital, expertise, and technology. However, unlike oil 
business deals, Kazakhstan’s uranium deals lack the geopolitical ulterior motive of 
extricating the republic away from Russia’s grip. Instead, the uranium strategy is more 
focused on garnering international prestige. 
Nazarbayev main strategy with uranium deals is to exchange, with any willing 
partner, Kazakhstan’s abundant uranium for investments of capital and advanced 
technology, for two purposes. In the short term, he wants the domestic nuclear industry to 
gain the capability of manufacturing higher grade nuclear fuel assemblies, which are 
ready to use and thus more profitable than raw material or fuel pellets.233 This capability 
will elevate Kazakhstan’s standing within the industry and expand its commercial 
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opportunities. Farther down the road, Nazarbayev wants Kazakhstan to become the first 
Central Asian country to generate commercial nuclear power within its borders. Nuclear 
power confers prestige on its possessor, elevates the country’s status among its neighbors 
and in the international community, and legitimizes the regime.234 
There is also a moral dimension to Kazakhstan’s nuclear activities that is not 
directly tied to commercial ventures, but nonetheless enhances the business deal strategy. 
Nazarbayev has successfully cultivated Kazakhstan’s image as an international leader on 
issues relating to nuclear security, which in turn bolsters the regime’s reputation as a 
trustworthy international nuclear business partner. Interestingly, Kazakhstan’s advocacy 
and actions on various nuclear issues operate on geoeconomic mechanisms, but in 
reverse. Rather than using economic instruments in an interdependent framework to gain 
leverage, Kazakhstan’s moral stance follows the logic of niche diplomacy, in which a 
middle power’s “agenda-based leadership” on one issue elevates its overall prominence 
in the international community relative to traditionally stronger states, which in this case 
are those that possess nuclear arsenals.235 This stance has earned Nazarbayev “moral 
capital,” which he can in turn spend in the economic realm. Within the politically volatile 
uranium and nuclear power industries, Kazakhstan’s moral capital buys it commercial 
credibility, thus facilitating business ventures that allow the regime to advance toward its 
own peaceful nuclear development goals.236 
(1) Win-Win Nuclear Deals 
The goal of achieving domestic commercial nuclear power is very evident in the 
terms of Kazakhstan’s uranium business deals with foreign partners, which often include 
technology assistance and feasibility studies that are related to nuclear power plants. 
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Founded in 1997, KazAtomProm is the national instrument on the uranium front; 
the firm owns or controls all aspects of uranium production in the country and is 
responsible for producing more than one third of global output needed for nuclear power 
and weapons.237 Similar to the oil industry, joint ventures are the norm in the ownership 
and operation of Kazakhstan’s domestic uranium mines. In 2016, out the world’s 15 most 
productive mines, seven are located in Kazakhstan and account for a quarter of the 
world’s total production by tonnage. While most of the other mines on this list have a 
single corporation as the dominant owner, all except two of Kazakhstan’s top mines are 
owned through joint ventures shared between various foreign uranium mining companies 
and KazAtomProm.238 KazAtomProm has also inked deals with Russia, Japan, China, 
India, Canada, South Korea, among others, that extend beyond raw uranium mining.239  
In July 2006, KazAtomProm and Russia signed three 50-50 nuclear joint venture 
agreements worth a total of $10 billion. These projects include the building of small and 
medium nuclear reactors, uranium enrichment plants, uranium exploration, and a 
feasibility study for a Kazakhstani nuclear power plant. Since April 2007, several deals 
between the Japanese government and firms with KazAtomProm have brought much-
desired nuclear technology to Kazakhstan in exchange for nuclear fuel production to 
sustain Japan’s energy needs. Also notably, KazAtomProm is looking beyond its 
traditional portfolio of mineral resources to include increased production of rare earth 
metals, a class of materials that are difficult to produce yet integral to manufacturing 
high-tech and renewable energy devices. In March and June of 2010, KazAtomProm 
signed separate agreements with the Japanese firms Sumitomo and Toshiba to create rare 
earth metals joint ventures, with the goal of producing 1,500 tonnes of rare earth oxides 
per year from treating uranium tailings, the sludge byproduct of processing uranium 
ore.240 In September of that year, several Japanese firms also agreed to conduct a nuclear 
power feasibility study in Kazakhstan. Even after the 2011 Fukushima accident, Japan’s 
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domestic about-face away from nuclear power has not stopped its continued cooperation 
to build nuclear reactors in Kazakhstan.241 
(2) The Commercial Benefits of Moral Positioning 
Besides forming business connections with many countries that have enhanced 
the regime’s commercial position in the industry, the sensitivities surrounding uranium 
have also allowed the regime to advance its diplomatic position through its moral stance 
on both civilian and military nuclear issues. Kazakhstan has received wide praise within 
the United Nations for consistently and vocally advocating for worldwide nuclear 
disarmament and for advancing the causes of uranium supply security and nuclear power 
safety.242 
As covered in Chapter III, Kazakhstan’s history as a nuclear weapons test site and 
Nazarbayev’s voluntary surrender of weapons and fissile material after independence lent 
a great measure of credence to the republic’s leadership in the United Nations’ 
disarmament efforts. Kazakhstan can place itself on the moral high ground to elevate its 
status vis-à-vis the nuclear powers, and this niche diplomacy is useful for building 
credibility that extends to other issues relating to uranium.243 
As part of its commitment to promoting international nuclear security, 
Kazakhstan has taken on several international initiatives. At the 2012 Nuclear Security 
Summit, Kazakhstani representatives announced the republic’s plan to open a Nuclear 
Security Training Center with the support of the U.S. National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA). The center, located in Alatau, opened in May 2017 and will 
“train personnel from local, regional, and international nuclear facilities and 
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organizations, [focusing] on fundamental and advanced nuclear security topics.”244 
Despite not having a commercial nuclear power plant, Kazakhstan does possess research 
reactors and produce nuclear fuel pellets, so domestic industry and academia will also 
benefit from the training center. Kazakhstan will also host the low-enriched uranium 
(LEU) fuel bank, scheduled to open in late 2017.245 Under the auspices of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), this fuel bank, located at the Ulba 
Metallurgical Plant in Oskemen, will contain a physical reserve of “up to 90 metric tons” 
of LEU, available to “eligible IAEA Member States” in case of supply disruptions due to 
exceptional circumstances. In establishing such an entity, the IAEA and countries 
possessing or looking to develop nuclear energy capacity recognize the importance of 
nuclear power within the future global energy portfolio and the need for a dependable 
supply of nuclear fuel.246 In August 2017, Astana is playing host to the 62nd Pugwash 
Conference, bringing together 200 experts and promoting dialogue on how best to 
address future disarmament, non-proliferation, and civilian nuclear energy issues.247 
Nazarbayev’s regime is pushing for the country to be front and center in the field of 
nuclear safety and security. 
Strategy 2: Exploiting geographical positioning between major powers 
Unlike oil and gas, which rely on expensive pipelines for efficient and profitable 
transport, uranium can move along existing roads, railroads, and maritime shipping 
routes. The uranium industry is largely devoid of the cutthroat stakes of pipeline politics, 
which Nazarbayev has employed to his geopolitical advantage. Although geography still 
plays an important role in Kazakhstan’s Eurasian identity as a commercial bridge 
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between East and West, Nazarbayev’s regime has not leveraged it much as a source of 
power in the context of uranium, when compared to oil and gas. 
Currently, commercial conversion facilities that process yellowcake and other 
uranium ore concentrates into useable nuclear fuel are located in only five countries: 
Canada, China, France, Russian, and the United States (Figure 5); thus, raw material or 
fuel pellets must travel long distances to these facilities before reaching customer 
countries.  From faraway producers, such as Australia, the material may travel tens of 
thousands of miles to reach these facilities.248 In comparison, Kazakhstan’s proximity to 
Chinese and Russian conversion plants allows for lower shipping costs and less time, 
making it an attractive alternative supplier. 
 
Figure 5.  Kazakhstani uranium is closer to fuel conversion facilities in Europe, 
China, and Russia than Canadian or Australian exports249 
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Kazakhstan’s uranium and nuclear industry has benefited from the country’s 
proximity to China, its biggest export destination, and the resulting closer commercial 
ties. In December 2006, China’s Guangdong Nuclear Power Group (now General 
Nuclear Corporation) and KazAtomProm signed a strategic cooperation agreement. This 
partnership has continued in the form of mutual investments in each other’s nuclear 
industry; China has taken part in Kazakhstani uranium mining ventures, and 
KazAtomProm has invested in Chinese nuclear power facilities.250 Still, in contrast to oil 
and gas, Kazakhstan’s nuclear joint ventures with China do not appear to be a hedge 
against Russian influences, as Kazakhstan has continued to closely cooperate with 
Russia’s nuclear industry. 
Although Nazarbayev has not exploited geography with respect to uranium as 
much as oil and gas, he has nonetheless promulgated Kazakhstan’s Eurasian identity as 
official ideology since 1994. This vision features Kazakhstan’s identity as both “a bridge 
between Asia and Europe” and the “heart of Eurasia.”251 In practice, more than an 
exporter of natural resources, Nazarbayev has embraced Kazakhstan’s role as a transit 
state, through which lucrative trade routes can pass between East Asia, Europe, the 
Middle East, and beyond. This role has most clearly manifested within China’s ambitious 
“One Belt, One Road” plan to revitalize the ancient Silk Road, which places Kazakhstan 
at the center of a vast network of transportation routes. This project is not geared toward 
uranium exclusively, but it demonstrates the importance that China places on its Central 
Asian neighbor as both a supplier of natural resources and a middleman that will facilitate 
global trade. 
In September 2013, the Chinese president Xi Jinping visited Central Asia and 
signed an agreement with Kazakhstan for up to $30 billion to encourage the development 
of transportation infrastructure. This investment also came with the promise that China 
would stay clear of Central Asia’s internal politics and not establish a sphere of 
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influence.252 This arrangement benefits the regime greatly. Along with the rest of Central 
Asia, Kazakhstan may be financially beholden to China’s largesse, but the regime can 
apply the financial resources as they see fit with little political interference, so long as the 
regime delivers the resources that China is after.253 
Nor is Kazakhstan merely paying lip service to fulfilling its role as a transit hub. 
In 2014, the government announced the “Nurly Zhol” plan to upgrade transportation 
infrastructure nation-wide, including new highways, ports, and ten tax-free special 
economic zones to encourage trade and investments. It remains to be seen whether these 
transportation projects will bear fruit, but the potential for Kazakhstan to gain both 
economic benefits and recognition as “a linchpin that physically connects the markets of 
China, Russia, South Asia, and Europe together” is a prime illustration of geoeconomics 
at work.254 
Strategy 3: Leveraging consumer states’ need for resources 
Supply scarcity for uranium can come from two main causes: physical production 
shortages and legal barriers to imports. As previously addressed, Kazakhstan’s growing 
production has brought much needed relief to the former. For the latter, the politically 
sensitive nature of uranium fuel can also work to Kazakhstan’s advantage. Kazakhstan’s 
increasingly dominant share of the uranium market raises the possibility that the republic 
may be in a position to use this resource as an energy weapon. However, despite a recent 
deliberate production cut that led to a global price jump, so far there are no indications 
that the republic has abandoned its commitment to being a reliable supplier to many 
customers in exchange for revenue or other forms of investment. Overall, when compared 
with the oil industry, Kazakhstan’s behavior toward consumer needs in the uranium 
industry is better characterized by transactional cooperation, rather than soft coercion, 
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with the result that Nazarbayev can preserve his regime’s friendly image that attracts 
continued business. 
In the company’s 2015 annual report, KazAtomProm notes that its top four 
uranium buyers are two Chinese nuclear power corporations, a French electricity 
company, and a U.S. nuclear fuel company; however, KazAtomProm does not disclose 
the amount that it sells to each customer.255 It is thus difficult to pin down exactly how 
much uranium importing countries are dependent on Kazakhstan’s supply and thus 
vulnerable to a hypothetical uranium weapon. Judging by sheer volume as the leading 
exporter and data revealed in scattered reports and supply agreements, it is clear that 
Kazakhstan is an important part of several countries’ supplier portfolio; however, 
Kazakhstan does not occupy such a dominant position among any one country’s suppliers 
to be able to wield coercive leverage. Consequently, it is unlikely to deploy the “uranium 
weapon.” 
Kazakhstan has found in China a steady appetite for its products, but the Chinese 
policy of diversifying among domestic and foreign sources makes it unlikely that 
Kazakhstan can dominate the Chinese market in the long term. Along with other energy 
sources, China is rapidly expanding its nuclear power production capability and 
increasing uranium imports.256 In 2012, China imported 12,908 tonnes, and 
18,968 tonnes in 2013, with Kazakhstan being a main supplier.257 In 2014, 
KazAtomProm reported that it exported 55 percent of its uranium production to China; 
this equates to around 7,500 tonnes, a significant portion of China’s import volume.258 
That said, China is also working toward the goal of fulfilling demand in equal parts by 
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domestic production, Chinese equity in foreign mines, and purchases on the open 
market.259 
Diversification has similar effects for Kazakhstan’s relationships with the two 
largest nuclear power-generating countries in the West. Energy independence was 
France’s response to the oil shocks of the 1970s, and it generates 75 percent of its 
electricity from 58 nuclear reactors. France even exports more than 10 percent of excess 
production to its European neighbors, including Germany and Switzerland, which have 
turned away from nuclear power. Most of France’s annual requirement of 10,500 tonnes 
comes from French-owned mines in Canada, with smaller portions coming from other 
producers, including Kazakhstan.260 The United States is relatively more dependent on 
Kazakhstan for uranium. According to the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA), 
Kazakhstan overtook Australia and became the leading uranium supplier to the United 
States in 2014, supplying almost 5,500 tonnes (23 percent) of the total U.S. demand, the 
highest in the world (Figure 6).261 This percentage is significant, but not dominant 
enough to be an overwhelming influence. 
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Figure 6.  United States’ increasing reliance on Kazakhstan’s uranium262 
However, Kazakhstan has leveraged its uranium exports in other ways. One main 
approach is to reach out to customers who are experiencing supply scarcity for various 
reasons and build mutually beneficial relationships that advance Kazakhstan’s nuclear 
interests. Until recently, India—a non-signatory nuclear weapons power to the NPT—has 
struggled to enter the global uranium market. Even after the country finally received an 
exemption to trade restrictions imposed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008, 
Australia still forbade exporting uranium to India, so Kazakhstan became one of its 
primary suppliers.263 In January 2009, India’s Nuclear Power Corporation signed an 
agreement with KazAtomProm to purchase 2,100 tonnes of uranium over several years, 
including 300 tonnes per year by 2011, which covered almost a third of India’s annual 
requirement.264 Nevertheless, Kazakhstan’s goal was not to dominate the Indian market; 
instead, it exploited the relationship to persuade India to conduct a feasibility study on 
building nuclear reactors in Kazakhstan.265 
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In the case of Brazil, government denial of environmental licenses has hampered 
the domestic nuclear industry’s efforts to develop one of the world’s ten largest uranium 
reserves, and Brazil’s nuclear power plants were running short of fuel. In May 2017, 
Kazakhstan saw the potential of this new market and offered to sell uranium to Brazil.266 
Market conditions have propelled much of Kazakhstan’s rise to the position of 
top-producer, and even though recently Kazakhstan has demonstrated its influence on the 
uranium market overall, there are still no signs that it will employ uranium as an energy 
weapon. Within the last decade, high uranium prices have driven consumers to search for 
cheaper sources, and Kazakhstan was ready to accept buyers. In 2014, the price of 
Kazakhstani uranium was $44.47 per pound, compared to the overall weighted average 
price of $46.65 from the other producing countries.267 According to an industry analyst, 
KazAtomProm’s ramped-up production actually became “one of the top causes” of a 
steep price drop, falling to as low as $18 in 2016.268 In response, KazAtomProm 
announced in the beginning of 2017 that it would cut the year’s production by 
2,000 tonnes, or ten percent of its total production and three percent of total global 
output.269 This business logic of this move is sound; nevertheless, the market’s reaction 
was dramatic. Spot price rose 10 percent when the news broke, but there are several 
reasons that this was not Kazakhstan’s bid to exert control of the market.270 First, even 
with the sudden spot price jump, at around $22 per pound, uranium prices are still near a 
historic low, so importers have few reasons to panic (Figure 7). Second, KazAtomProm’s 
move is more a rational market response than a proxy political move on the regime’s 
behalf. Having over-produced, even in the face of decreasing worldwide demand after the 
Fukushima accident in 2011, KazAtomProm’s chairman Askar Zhumagaliyev admitted 
that “these … assets are far more valuable to our shareholders … being left in the 
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ground.”271 Lastly, rather than pulling away, KazAtomProm has shown commitment to 
deepen its involvement in the uranium market by opening a branch office in Switzerland 
so it can more actively trade on the spot market.272 
 
Figure 7.  Uranium prices are at the lowest in the last decade273 
Importers’ dependence on Kazakhstan is varied across the market. Although 
Kazakhstan has positioned itself as one of the main uranium suppliers of several 
countries, satisfying as much as a third of their requirements, it has shown no sign of 
coercively exercising this leverage. This is an economically rational policy. The exercise 
of coercive measures in this market would likely degrade existing partnerships and cut 
off Kazakhstan from the infusion of capital and technology that it needs. Since 
Kazakhstan’s uranium mines are “the lowest cost operators in the world,” it can compete 
on economic terms and carry out its policy goals based on mutually beneficial 
interdependence to gain revenue and technological capital. 
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Strategy 4: Using resource rents to strengthen the economy 
Even with its high level of production, Kazakhstan’s uranium revenue is small 
compared with that of oil, and thus it is not a very significant source of funding for the 
domestic economy. According to KazAtomProm, 71 percent of the company’s total 
revenue in 2015 came from the sale of uranium, worth only about $853 million.274 As 
part of the diverse portfolio of the SWF Samruk-Kazyna, KazAtomProm contributes to 
the stability of the economy, however slightly. The company also employs close to 
27,000 employees through “about 70 subsidiaries and affiliates operating in seven 
regions” of the country.275 Uranium production-related employment increased 18–19 
percent from 2013 to 2014, and several training centers around the country prepare 
students and future employees for the industry.276 Currently, without a domestic 
commercial nuclear power plant, all of Kazakhstan’s uranium is exported, and internal 
demand does not seem likely to materialize before 2020.277 Until nuclear power becomes 
a reality in Kazakhstan and potentially transforms the domestic energy market, the impact 
of the uranium industry on the economy overall will remain limited. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Nazarbayev regime has applied its geoeconomic strategies somewhat differently 
to Kazakhstan’s fossil fuel resources and uranium. Even though the overarching multi-
vectorism is consistent between the two types of resources, the regime has implemented 
all four hypothesized strategies heavily through oil and pipeline politics while only some 
of the strategies have applied to uranium, and mostly to a lesser degree. These differences 
are summarized in Table 4. 
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Table 4.   Nazarbayev’s geoeconomic strategies: The extent of application to oil 
and uranium 
 Oil Uranium 
1. Business deals High High 
2. Geography High Low 
3. Consumer need High Moderate 
4. Domestic economy High Low 
 
Examining these strategies also revealed some differences in the flavor of 
Kazakhstan’s interactions with its international partners. In the oil and pipeline industries, 
these interactions have sometimes taken on a more confrontational tone, which can be 
explained by the urgent strategic goal of keeping Russian influence at bay while 
extracting economic benefits from other major powers. In contrast, this dynamic appears 
to be completely absent in the nuclear realm, where Nazarbayev has presented himself as 
a champion of peace and security and Kazakhstan as the model business partner. These 
findings are summarized in Table 5. 
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Table 5.   Nazarbayev’s geoeconomic strategies: The character of 
international interactions 
 Oil Uranium 
1. Business deals Cooperative Confrontational toward Russia Cooperative 
2. Geography Cooperative Cooperative 
3. Consumer need Cooperative Exploitative of foreign firms Cooperative 
 
These varying characteristics may stem from the fundamental differences between 
oil and uranium, the most significant being their relative significance as an energy source 
and the socio-political concerns surrounding each resource. Although the global energy 
portfolio is unlikely to shift so suddenly as to put oil and uranium on equal footing within 
years or even decades, concerns over climate change may gradually alter the balance and 
elevate uranium’s status as a reliable and, ironically, safer energy source. Since some of 
Kazakhstan’s more confrontational behaviors regarding oil could be due to the republic’s 
dependence on the resource for survival, especially in the early days of independence, it 
is imaginable that, should uranium become the main revenue-generating mineral 
resource, Kazakhstan’s policies toward it may evolve as well.  
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V. THE KAZAKHSTAN WAY: TO NOW AND FORWARD 
A. ACHIEVEMENTS SO FAR 
Judging from Kazakhstan’s dismal conditions in the early days of its 
independence, a shrewd gambler could be forgiven for writing off the republic’s future 
prospects. At best, Kazakhstan should have fallen prey to the resource curse and 
remained a backwards petrostate; at worst, it could have collapsed under the stress of 
internal divisions and a failing economy. Instead, Nazarbayev’s regime has managed to 
build a middle power with a vibrant economy that has improved the lives of ordinary 
Kazakhstanis and earned a reputation as a steadfast champion of peace. The mere 
presence of large quantities of oil and gas, while crucial for the economy, cannot by itself 
explain this achievement; Nazarbayev’s regime has made strategic choices and 
implemented policies that steered the country onto an upward path, even as it brutally 
consolidated power and reaped the benefits of outsized rents. 
In hindsight, Nazarbayev’s early decision to abandon the militaristic path to 
building power was a watershed event in Kazakhstan’s modern history. Voluntarily 
giving up its large store of inherited Soviet nuclear arsenal and weapons-grade fissile 
material was one of Kazakhstan’s most significant steps in realizing Nazarbayev’s multi-
vector foreign policy, since this display of goodwill opened the door to the West. 
Through this opening, Nazarbayev eagerly invited in the ideas and investments that 
helped him fend off Russian influence, allowing for the freer pursuit of his strategic goals 
going forward. 
With this freedom to maneuver, Nazarbayev experimented with a variety of 
geoeconomic strategies with less worry that Kazakhstan would fall back into Moscow’s 
orbit and recede into irrelevance. The overall goal of these strategies is threefold: secure 
the regime’s power, strengthen Kazakhstan’s position relative to its stronger neighbors, 
and advance Kazakhstan’s international status. The overarching philosophy is that 
Kazakhstan would both internally balance, specifically regarding its economy, and 
externally build commercial and diplomatic ties with willing foreign partners without 
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allowing any one of them to wield dominant influence over Kazakhstan’s domestic 
affairs. 
This thesis examined the application of these strategies to two types of energy 
resources: oil and gas, which have received a lot of attention in the literature, and 
uranium, which has received very little. Despite the overall consistent multi-vector 
philosophy that has guided Kazakhstan’s management of both of these resources, the 
differences are significant enough to demonstrate that not all natural resources are equally 
significant politically, or at least, not significant in the same way.  
The sheer size of Kazakhstan’s fossil fuel economy forces the regime to be more 
aggressive in managing this resource, whether in dealing with questionable foreign 
actors, using the proximity of China to balance out Russia, or enticing foreign 
governments and firms with large appetites into unfavorable deals. In contrast, since 
uranium constitutes a much smaller segment of Kazakhstan’s economy and Nazarbayev’s 
strategic goal of building domestic nuclear power depends heavily on influx of foreign 
capital, knowledge, and technology, Kazakhstan’s behavior in this industry appears 
exclusively cordial and cooperative. Kazakhstan’s moral stance on nuclear disarmament, 
nonproliferation, and safety also bolsters its image as the model partner on nuclear issues 
and in the uranium market. 
Finally, a significant portion of Kazakhstan’s resource revenue is devoted to 
strengthening its overall economy, a clear sign that it is consciously avoiding the pitfalls 
of the resource curse. Here again, fossil fuel revenues matter more due to their larger 
relative size, but the mechanisms of improvements are similar: revenue streams feed into 
SWFs that invest in other industries or act as stability funds, and human capital 
development, especially education, is—somewhat surprisingly—a central concern for this 
semi-authoritarian regime. 
B. CHALLENGES AHEAD 
Kazakhstan has made remarkable strides in the face of formidable challenges over 
the last 25 years of independence, but as the old investment adage cautions, “Past 
performance is no guarantee of future results.” Corruption, economic diversification, and 
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political continuity are several issues that threaten to derail Kazakhstan’s ascent. 
Kazakhstan must continue to urgently address these areas, while it still has the advantage 
of prosperity and stability, or it risks squandering its impressive accomplishments. 
1. Corruption 
Based on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, although 
Kazakhstan ranks the highest among Central Asian republics, with a score of 29 out of a 
100 (compared with the world average of 43), it still places near the global bottom at 131 
out of 176 countries.278 Such sustained corruption gradually erodes the goodwill of 
foreign leaders and investors and the trust of the domestic population, both of which have 
been critical to the regime’s building of power.  
International institutions, such as the OECD, continue to work with domestic 
actors to develop anti-corruption strategies, but, so far, OECD’s assessment of 
Kazakhstan’s progress has been mixed.279 Observers have expressed concerns that the 
regime has given more power to Kazakhstan’s Secret Services in the name of anti-
corruption, but it is in fact using this effort as a tool to root out political opposition.280 
The OECD’s report notes a lack of implementation of the organization’s 
recommendations in several areas, but it also praises Kazakhstan’s progress on criminal 
law reform, civil service regulation, and integrity in the business sector.281 In an 
announcement of the opening of an anti-corruption educational program in Almaty, the 
Chair of Transparency International Kazakhstan emphasized the importance of realizing 
that corruption is a cultural problem in Kazakhstan, and thus a comprehensive program 
that starts early in the lives of all Kazakhstanis that permeates all levels is key to 
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combatting the problem.282 This is no doubt an uphill struggle, and the international 
community must continue to engage the Kazakhstani government to ensure progress. 
2. Economic Reform and Diversification 
The economy has been the main engine that has provided both the financial 
strength and sociopolitical stability for Nazarbayev’s power building, and its sustained 
growth is crucial for the future of both the regime and the republic overall. To that end, 
Kazakhstan needs to continue its economic diversification and systemic reform efforts 
because its economy’s heavy reliance on mineral resource is a liability in the long term, 
even though this source of revenue has propelled development up to this point.  
The economist Dani Rodrik writes that “igniting economic growth and sustaining 
it are somewhat different enterprises,” since the former requires only limited reforms that 
do not disrupt the existing economic institutions, while the latter requires a deeper 
institutional foundation to support a resilient and dynamic economy.283 While Rodrik 
would likely agree with Nazarbayev that Kazakhstan does not have to follow any 
standard script of economic development—indeed, there are many varying examples of 
successful formulas around the world—he also cautions that “no country has experienced 
rapid growth without minimal adherence to … principles of sound economic 
governance—property rights, market-oriented incentives, sound money, fiscal 
solvency.”284 Nazarbayev’s regime has made improvements in several of these areas, 
notably property rights and market incentives, with encouraging foreign investments and 
privatized ownership of mineral resources being prime examples.  
Nevertheless, as the detrimental effects of collapsing oil prices on Kazakhstan’s 
GDP and currency have demonstrated since 2014, the country needs to rapidly move into 
and open up alternative commercial spheres that can grow independently of oil revenue. 
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Nazarbayev’s educational focus toward high technological fields is a step in the right 
direction. Also, Astana’s hosting of the 2017 EXPO, “essentially the world’s largest 
science fair,” is the regime’s latest ostentatious effort to both increase Kazakhstan’s 
international stature and pave the way for economic diversification.285 With the theme of 
“Future Energy,” the EXPO is broadcasting Kazakhstan’s goal of diversifying away from 
natural resource dependence and into other fields, including alternative energy and 
finance.286 While the economy is still thriving, now is the time to implement reforms that 
the regime has been putting off in the name of preserving stability, since such reforms are 
“much easier to undertake in an environment of growth rather than stagnation.”287 
3. Political Succession 
The durability of the current favorable environment will also soon be tested by the 
question of leadership succession. Nazarbayev has ruled Kazakhstan since 1989 and has 
been called “the longest-serving and, arguably, most effective leader in the former Soviet 
Union [republics].”288 Through his vision of an Eurasian Kazakhstan and his adroit 
implementation of the multi-vector foreign policy, Kazakhstan has become a key partner 
to several major powers—specifically the United States, Russia, and China—in various 
spheres without falling under the dominance of any one of them. Yet he has also 
maintained power at home through no small amount of intrigue, dealing mercilessly with 
political opponents when he has deemed it necessary.289  
The super-presidentialist political system that Nazarbayev has constructed with 
the support of Kazakhstani elites has inextricably wedded his personage to the fate of the 
republic. This is a problem for Kazakhstan going forward. In this political system, the 
assumption of equivalence between Nazarbayev’s policy decisions with those of 
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Kazakhstan as a whole has been largely valid so far. However, after toiling as a 
steelworker early in life, this 77-year-old ruler’s long political career may be near the 
end, and the path of succession is far from clear. One Russian scholar observed that “the 
next president could try to preserve the autocratic system, but … without Mr. Nazarbayev 
the structure would fall apart in five years,” and, evidently, the Kazakhstani people and 
the elites share this concern.290  
Nazarbayev has carefully cultivated a cult of personality that renders alternatives 
difficult, if not impossible, to imagine. In 2015, Nazarbayev received “countless 
endorsements from his party colleagues” to enter the 2016 presidential elections, despite 
outwardly expressing ambivalence for running again.291 Once Nazarbayev announced his 
entrance, there was little doubt that he would win handily, even under normal electoral 
circumstances.292 William Easterly argues that even if, by avoiding democratic 
stalemates that impede development, a “benevolent autocrat” with good intentions—a 
description befitting Nazarbayev—deserves the credit for his nation’s progress, a debate 
over this narrative and alternative forms of government should still take place because 
“unrestrained power will always turn out to be the enemy of development.”293 
Unfortunately, such debate is largely stifled in Kazakhstan. 
With Nazarbayev’s every successive term in office, the political system that has 
provided much needed stability is also keeping the country ill-prepared for the inevitable 
and uncertain transition, likely limiting Kazakhstan’s future prospects. On this front, the 
outside world has little choice but to observe the movements of emerging political 
factions, mediate where possible, and hope that the nascent institutions that sprang up 
during Nazarbayev’s rule will stay standing amid the power struggle after he is gone. 
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C. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
Triumphant Western liberalism after the Soviet Union’s fall helped stabilize 
Kazakhstan and propel its rise by accepting it into the international fold and mitigating 
Russia’s influence, but the republic has not embraced liberal democracy in return. In the 
decades since, it became clear that Western liberalism would not become the prevailing 
political ideology for all countries, as Francis Fukuyama predicted, and a more diverse 
political ecosystem grew out of the rubble of a bipolar world order.294 With the rising 
economic strength of China and its willingness to “go out” in search of resources and 
investment opportunities, the United States has had to struggle with its diminished 
influence in Central Asian regional politics, a reality that came to the fore during 
contentious negotiations of wartime overflight and basing rights after September 11.295 
Formerly minor states at the periphery of America’s concern can now gain prestige and 
power by balancing the major powers against one another or accentuating their positions 
on niche issues where major powers lack coverage or credibility. 
The sum of these effects on American foreign policy is to force a turn away from 
idealism toward pragmatism. Studying Kazakhstan’s rise up to this point, despite the two 
countries’ very different political systems, should help America’s leaders recognize that 
there are various ways to run a country successfully, some of which might be 
ideologically incompatible with the American way. Yet the United States should continue 
to engage illiberal regimes by appealing to shared values and common interests on issues 
such as nuclear nonproliferation and economic development. Kazakhstan’s foreign policy 
successes have demonstrated the value of a multi-vectored strategy in a multipolar world, 
where countries have the option of building ties with several major powers or none at all. 
The lecturing and prodding method of spreading liberal democracy is losing traction 
when foreign rulers can hold on to political power while developing their economy, and 
the champions of this ideal need to find other ways to attract new adherents to the gospel 
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of liberal democracy. It is time for the United States to re-evaluate its promotion of the 
liberal democratic order through the lens of geoeconomics and chart its foreign policy 
path forward accordingly. 
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